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ABSTRACT
What does the historical record tell us about how to conduct monetary policy in a deflationary
environment? We present a broad cross-country historical study of deflation over the past two
centuries in order to shed light on current policy challenges. We first review the theoretical literature
on deflation. We then characterize deflation by distinguishing among the "good, the bad and the
ugly" ones - considering both empirical determinants and historical narratives of each type. Emphasis
is put on the linkages between the current inflation environment and that of the gold standard period.
Particular attention is also put on what the historical record reveals about policies to escape
undesirable deflation. In this regard we develop a policy typology based on the relative merits of
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After 20 years during which inflation was viewed as public enemy number one, the spotlight 
has recently shifted to deflation, defined as a sustained decline in the aggregate price level. 
Although deflation has been treated as a new and daunting policy challenge, it is far from new 
and need not be daunting. In the century before World War I, price levels in many countries 
declined as often as they rose and, moreover, falling prices were not always associated with 
recessions. Indeed many deflation episodes were “good” in the sense that they were 
associated with productivity-driven economic growth. 
Our paper looks back in history to the time when deflation was commonplace in order to 
draws lessons for the current policy environment (see Table 1 which presents evidence on the 
incidence of deflation for 30 countries over 2 centuries). Deflation and near-deflation 
experiences in recent years around the world (briefly reviewed in Box 1) have raised 
important monetary policy questions, such as how bad is deflation? how can an unwelcome 
deflation be avoided? how can one escape a deflation? what type of institutional frameworks 
are more immune from the negative aspects of deflation? To be sure, there are differences 
between the policy environment today and the ones in the distant past. But, the similarities are 
sufficiently close to shed light on current policy challenges. In other words, the historical 
record provides a fertile “laboratory” to study how an economic environment behaves in 
deflationary times and to gain some insight into the policies that may help current policy 
makers. 
The paper begins with a brief survey of some theoretical issues and monetary policy 
dimensions of deflation. This discussion provides a backdrop with which to interpret much of 
the evidence on deflation that we present, which draws from the historical records of many 
countries with several having data going back as far as the past two centuries. Our survey of 
history corroborates the view that historical deflations fall into three broad categories: “the 
good, the bad and the ugly”. To understand the differences, we first use historical narratives to 
identify and illustrate each of these three types of deflation. We then provide a more formal 
statistical evaluation of the determinants of different types of deflationary episodes. Armed 
with these results, we turn in the last section to lessons to be learned about the efficacy of 
monetary policy in dealing with inflation/deflation, and offer a holistic approach to frame the 
challenges facing policy makers. In this regard, several different zones of price level 
movements, ranging from high inflation to deep deflation, highlight the differential role of 
monetary policy in each. From this perspective, the contemporary policy tradeoffs of dealing 
with deflation are, arguably, put in a clearer light. In particular, the historical record suggests 
that all deflations are not alike and therefore may require different approaches. 
Our historical approach leads us to conclude that most central banks today put too little 
emphasis on the role of monetary aggregates in assessing the broad strategic policy tradeoffs 
presented by deflation and that economists are often too eager to characterize low inflation 
economies as being in a liquidity trap. History shows that the usefulness of monetary 
aggregate targeting (versus interest rate targeting) depends nonlinearly on the 
inflation/deflation zone the economy is in. For high inflation and deep deflation, monetary 
targeting appears to be a relatively effective guide for policy. When inflation is low, the 
usefulness of the monetary aggregates may be exceeded by short-term interest rates, 
especially if velocity is sufficiently unpredictable. In the broader context of monetary 
frameworks, however, our analysis sheds light on the importance of mixed monetary policy 
strategies. History suggests that a monetary framework that combines the best features of 
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monetary aggregate and interest rate targeting, not unlike the current approach of the 
European Central Bank, is more likely to be a robust approach to the varied inflation/deflation 
challenges, as have been experienced in the past. 
2. CONCEPTUAL  ISSUES 
Deflation can be a confusing concept for policymakers. At the most simple level, deflation is 
a statistical definition – a falling price level. But in policy discussions, deflation can represent 
both the symptom and the cause of different economic phenomena. In this section, we discuss 
various features of deflation to set up our historical analysis of the different types of 
deflations. 
2.1.  Types of deflation 
History suggests that deflations come in three basic types: the good, the bad and the ugly 
(Bordo, Landon-Lane and Redish (2004) and Borio and Filardo (2004)). The differences 
among these types arise from the shocks that cause them and the impact of falling prices on 
how the economy subsequently responses. 
Bad deflations are those associated with recessions. In the pre-1960 period, economic 
contractions arising from demand deficiencies, ie the leftward shift in aggregate demand, 
were more likely associated with deflation. In the 1960 to mid-1990s period when the trend 
rate of inflation was positive, economic weakness was associated with disinflation. An 
empirical question still remains about whether deflation, in contrast to disinflation, made 
economic downturns worse than would otherwise be the case. If deflation was not simply a 
symptom of weak demand in a low inflation environment but rather the cause of additional 
rounds of economic weakness, bad deflations would be outcomes that policy makers might 
want to fight more vigorously. We will provide a more nuanced understanding of this issue of 
bad deflations in the following theoretical discussion of optimal inflation/deflation rates and 
in the empirical section by offering new evidence on the symmetry of the inflation/deflation 
processes in the historical data. 
By means of contrast, good deflations are those that arise from positive supply shocks. In a 
standard aggregate supply and demand framework, an outward shift in the supply curve will 
put downward price pressures. If the initial inflation rate is low enough, deflation may be 
realized. Such shocks would be generally accompanied by lower product prices, but higher 
profits, rising real wages, higher asset prices and stronger financial sector performance. 
Ugly deflations represent periods of steeply declining prices associated with severe recession. 
During these periods, declining prices arising from aggregate demand are sufficient to 
feedback to aggregate supply via onerous debt burdens, personal and corporate bankruptcies, 
financial crises and other adverse conditions; policy failures, especially from monetary policy, 
may add to the severity and the length of the downturns. As we will show, such conditions 
have occurred, but have been quite rare. The recent literature on deflation and monetary 
policy has focused on the possibility that monetary policy may lose its effectiveness in such 
extreme situations as when a liquidity trap occurs; while the theoretical literature offers novel 
solutions for such situations, we find little evidence that such extreme situations are of 
practical policy relevance today. 
To be sure, the taxonomy of the good, the bad and the ugly is simplistic. But this rhetorical 
device gets at the heart of the policy issue. Not all deflations are alike. As the labels suggest, 
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good deflations are likely to be less worrisome to a policy maker than a bad or ugly deflation. 
Therefore it is important to distinguish types of deflation.  
Moreover, it is important to note that while deflation has the possibility of making an 
undesirable condition worse, it is also true that inflation can do the same. While we will not 
be stressing the inflation record, it is well known that inflation can cause economic distortions 
that rise with the level of inflation. Inflation can lead to direct resource costs as agents expend 
time and effort to economize on cash balances. Moreover, high inflation has traditionally been 
associated with information-jamming volatility in relative prices which not only distorts final 
good allocations but can also “throw sand in the gears” of the labor and capital markets. In 
emerging market economies, high inflation environments has led in the past to the closure of 
domestic long-term bond markets and to an increase in economic uncertainty, reduced 
investment and lower growth. Even though this paper will focus on what we can learn about 
the policy tradeoffs in a deflationary environment, we use the inflation history as a means of 
comparison when framing the policy options. 
2.2.  The optimal inflation/deflation rate from a theoretical perspective 
In theory, “deflation is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon”, to paraphrase 
Milton Friedman (1968). It is monetary in the sense that the sustained growth in some 
monetary aggregate relative to the trend growth of real output (adjusted for the trend in 
velocity) determines the rate of change in the price level. 
Theory also provides insights on the costs and possible benefits of deflation. On the one hand, 
Friedman (1969) argued that deflation might be optimal. In an economy with fully flexible 
wages and prices, the costs of inflation arise from the opportunity cost of holding money 
balances. Friedman advocates a negative optimal inflation rate, ie deflation, equal in absolute 
value to the long run growth of the real economy or, in general, equal to the real interest rate.
1 
In other words, when the nominal interest rate is zero, the return on money and risk-free 
bonds would be equilibrated, thereby leading to an optimal outcome.
2 Extending this model to 
the world of public finance leads to a refinement of this finding. Under particular 
circumstances, it would be optimal to tax money balances at the Ramsey tax rate. This could 
suggest a nominal interest rate above zero. But other versions of this model, eg one where 
money is viewed as an intermediate good, would endorse the original Friedman rule because 
of the general principle in public finance that only final goods should be taxed (Chari et al 
(1991), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001)).
3
On the other hand, theories of inflation in economies subject to nominal rigidities lead to 
higher optimal inflation/deflation rates. In an economy subject to nontrivial price stickiness, 
for example, the optimal inflation rate would generally be zero, ignoring the costs arising 
                                                           
1  The same outcome can be achieved by paying interest on money balances equal to the yield on close money 
substitutes. 
2   Lucas (2000) estimates, while admittedly with a wide potential range, that the decline in the steady-state 
inflation rate from zero to a deflation of roughly 3 percent could yield the same economic benefits as a 
decline of inflation from 11 percent to zero percent. 
3   Feldstein (1999) also argues that the interaction of the tax code and inflation causes significant welfare losses 
at low levels of positive price increases (ie inflation). More efficient capital taxation would improve 
intergenerational welfare. 
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from holding money balances.
4 If both sticky prices and costly money holding motives were 
operative, the optimal deflation rate would be somewhere between 0 and the real interest rate 
(Chari (2004)). Of note, this range is below conventional implicit and explicit inflation targets 
used by central banks today. 
Other forms of nominal rigidities have been emphasized in theoretical studies to justify an 
optimal positive inflation rate. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) have argued that downward 
nominal wage inflexibility (ie the reluctance of employees to accept cuts in nominal wages) 
could be a significant source of economic costs that would be avoided by keeping the inflation 
rate sufficiently high. But while this view is logically consistent from a theoretical point of 
view, the empirical support at the macroeconomic level has been weak. Lebow et al (1999), 
for example, raised doubts about the macroeconomic significance of this view. They argue 
that the type of downward nominal rigidity would imply highly asymmetric Phillips curves, 
which does not appear to be consistent with the data in the post-World War II period. 
This theory rests heavily on the assumption that employees dislike nominal wage cuts more 
than real wage cuts of the same size – a form of price illusion. Recent wage setting behavior, 
especially in Asian economies experiencing persistent deflation, has raised doubts about the 
significance of this type of price illusion. In Asia, downward nominal wage flexibility became 
increasingly evident as the deflation environment became more familiar.
5 This all goes to 
suggest that such notions of downward wage inflexibility that were formed during the Great 
Inflation era may in fact be regime dependent. It is possible that once a low inflation or 
moderate deflation environment were to become more familiar, the past psychological 
aversion to downward nominal, rather than real, movements would become less of a 
constraint.
6 Unfortunately, from a historical perspective, testing such theories would require 
                                                           
4   Selgin (1997) argues that fixed nominal wage contracts are a much more important source of economic 
distortions than final goods prices. If so, in a world of productivity growth, stable nominal wages contribute 
to macroeconomic efficiency, leading to his view of a “productivity norm”, ie a deflation rate set to the rate 
of productivity growth. Precursors of this view go back to Keynes and his contemporaries. 
5   Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003) find statistical evidence of nominal wage rigidities in Japan, but one is struck 
by their figure 1 which shows that nominal wage cuts are far from rare. Likewise, evidence from Switzerland 
(Fehr and Goette (2004)) and the United States (Lebow et al (1999)) is consistent with the fact that nominal 
wage cuts are not rare; Fehr and Goette (2004) also show the distribution of nominal wage changes does shift 
over time, especially as the economy shifts from experiencing inflation to deflation. Fan (2003) documents 
time series evidence of nominal wage cuts in Hong Kong. Overall, the evidence on nominal wage flexibility 
is inconclusive. On the one hand, there is ample evidence that nominal wage changes tend to pile up at zero 
in cross sectional data, especially in economies that are used to inflation. On the other hand, there is ample 
evidence of nominal wage cuts, which weakens the argument that employees simply will not accept nominal 
wage cuts. Moreover, some evidence suggests that total nominal compensation is more flexible than nominal 
wages (Lebow et al (1999)). On the whole, in low inflation and deflation environments, the empirical record 
is consistent with the view that workers can reframe their wage expectations, putting more emphasis on real 
rather than nominal wage changes. 
6   Bewley (1995) stresses the possible adverse morale effects of nominal wage cuts. Again, however, the notion 
of what effects morale would depend on the inflation regime. Akerlof et al (2000) raise the possibility that 
near-rational agents may systematically underestimate the costs of low inflation and hence produce an 
equilibrium with a lower unemployment rate and more moderate wage demands than would be the case in a 
purely rational expectations model. In either case, the theories are interesting but not sufficiently explicit to 
understand how behavior might change as agents became accustomed to a low inflation environment. Some 
of these eclectic theories reflect the fact that the literature on price and wage stickiness is based on a 
somewhat not well understood view of firm behavior. For example, Blinder et al (1998) finds considerable 
explanatory gaps between academic theories of price stickiness and real world survey evidence, yet 
concludes there is cross-sectional evidence that supports the notion of downward nominal wage rigidities at 
the microeconomic level. 
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cross-sectional data that is not readily available. Instead, we will use indirect measures to 
address the empirical issue. 
Another cost of deflation is related to redistributive losses.
7 Friedman’s optimum quantity of 
money assumes that deflation is fully anticipated. If this is not the case, then agents who fail 
to fully anticipate deflation and are unable to index their contracts would suffer losses relative 
to those who could. History shows that such redistributive costs can be rather significant, as 
the losers (for example, debtors, farmers, workers, etc) had at times reacted to their situation 
through political agitation. Moreover, debt deflation – a fall in the price level that raises the 
real value of nominal debt – can exacerbate the costs of a deflation (Fisher (1933)). This 
redistributive cost, however, would not obviously be any different than that of a similarly-
sized disinflation in an environment of positive inflation. 
Financial stability could also be affected by unanticipated price movements. In an economic 
environment without complete financial markets in nominal risk sharing, unanticipated price 
shocks could have important consequences for financial instability and the associated 
macroeconomic costs (Schwartz (1995)). Bordo, Dueker and Wheelock (2002, 2003) 
document that, in the pre-1934 period, aggregate price shocks had a significantly negative 
impact on financial conditions. By the 1970s, however, inflation shocks rather than price 
shocks were playing the dominant role in this respect.  
In sum, theory provides some guidance on the optimal inflation rate, but such guidance is 
somewhat wide ranging. The precise estimate would depend on critical, yet controversial, 
assumptions. In other words, reasonable, or at least not implausible, assumptions could justify 
a range of estimates. In general, the optimal inflation rate should be low, possibly as low as a 
moderate deflation.
8 From the tenor of the current policy debate, however, one would be led 
to believe that most policy makers consider deflation to be a subpar outcome. In a narrow 
sense this might be tautologically true. For explicit and implicit inflation targeters, a deflation 
outcome indicates a policy failure because, to our knowledge, no central bank targets 
deflation. But, in a broader sense, the debate about how low the inflation rate should be is still 
open, with modest steady-state deflation deserving ample consideration.  
2.3.  Beyond theory: monetary policy considerations 
In policy circles, some of the theoretical conclusions might still sound impractical, imprudent 
and, in the extreme, wrong-headed. In this section we review various important dimensions of 
deflation dynamics that may lead policy makers to take a more averse view of deflation. We 
emphasize the potential effects of deflation on the effectiveness of monetary policy, the role 
                                                           
7   See Humphrey (2003) for a discussion of how classical economists looked at the problem of systematic 
redistributions during unanticipated deflations. The deflation-induced redistributions were generally seen as 
having net negative knock-on effects because the consequences for the most leveraged in society were often 
disproportionately large. 
8   In determining a quantitative measure of this rate, policymakers would also have to factor in statistical biases 
in conventionally-measured inflation rates. The well-known biases in index theory suggest that measured 
price changes are biased upwards. In theory, the costs of inflation and deflation should be evaluated relative 
to the economically meaningful, rather than the purely statistical measure. In the United States, for instance, 
the bias has been estimated to be somewhere between .5 to 1 percent, which may not be too far out of line 
with ballpark estimates in other economies. These estimates are consistent with those found in Lebow and 
Rudd (2003) and Rodriguez-Palenzuela and Wynne (2004). If true, actual deflation would likely coincide 
with a positive rate of measured inflation somewhere below 1 percent. Of course, inflation illusion may also 
play a role, but such effects are thought to be small. 
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of the monetary policy regime on deflation expectation formation and the potential 
complications from asset price booms and busts. The historical record can provide some 
insights into the relevance of the factors as well as the tradeoffs. 
2.3.1.  The effectiveness of monetary policy 
Deflation is also thought to complicate the conduct of monetary policy in various ways. First, 
the recent spectre of deflation represents a relatively unfamiliar territory in which central 
banks have to operate. To the extent that economic relationships that hold in moderate 
inflation regimes break down during deflations, a central bank may find it harder to interpret 
economic developments and to understand the monetary transmission mechanism. This new 
policy environment could also make it more difficult for the monetary authority to 
communicate its policy stance and future intentions to the public. This, of course, could have 
real effects on the ability of the private sector to form expectations and plan optimally. One 
would expect, however, that these costs would be transitory as central banks and the public 
became accustomed to the new environment. 
Second, the zero lower bound for short-term nominal interest rates would also adversely 
complicate monetary policy, if only because central banks could not rely on interest rates to 
pursue their inflation and output goals. Again, such an environment would be a challenge, at 
least in the short run, as policymakers would have to alter their tactics and recalibrate their 
policy tools. The interwar period during the 20th century offers a glimpse into some of the 
possible complications and will be discussed below. 
Third, deflationary environments can hinder the ability of central banks to pursue 
countercyclical monetary policies. In the extreme, if a deflation was deep enough and 
expectations became sufficiently entrenched, a liquidity trap could form (Bernanke (2002), 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Fujiki et al (2001), Keynes (1936), Krugman (1998), 
Svensson (2001, 2003a&b)). Economists often point to the 1930s as an example of such 
conditions. Liquidity traps represent an extreme situation where the tools of monetary policy 
would be ineffective in stimulating aggregate demand. Such a situation would preclude the 
generally-presumed benefits of countercyclical policies on economic welfare. 
All these policy complications are clearly costs that would have to be factored into the 
decision to pursue a low inflation/deflation policy. Arguably, most of the costs could prove to 
be transitory as a central bank became accustomed to the new policy environment. 
2.3.2. Deflation,  monetary  regimes and credible nominal anchors 
One perennial issue in monetary economics is the design of nominal anchors and their role in 
shaping private sector expectations. In the past several decades, economists and policymakers 
have emphasized the importance of low, stable inflation. Part of the emphasis reflected the 
history of the fiat currency regime in the twentieth century. Reining in high inflation was a 
challenge. Should current fiat money regimes put greater emphasis on price stability? In the 
nineteenth
 and early twentieth century, the emphasis was squarely on a credible price level 
anchor in the form of the gold standard, which offers some insights about how a more 
effective anchor may influence the economic environment. 
The classical gold standard provides a good example of how important the monetary regime is 
in determining the aggregate price level and shaping expectation about the future level. Under 
the gold standard, the world price level was determined by the demand and supply for 
monetary gold and, in turn, by a function of gold production and the relative demands on gold 
for monetary and non-monetary uses (Bordo (1999)). Moreover, the international monetary 
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arrangements at the time meant that the price levels of individual countries would be tied 
together by commodity market arbitrage and capital flows. Deviations of one country’s price 
level from its trading partners and interest rates from the world financial center in London, 
provided incentives for both corrective gold flows and short-term capital flows. 
The self-correcting nature of the gold standard had powerful effects on price expectations. 
Shocks to the gold market, such as gold discoveries, naturally caused the price level to move 
but it would be expected to revert back towards some stable value, ie prices would tend to be 
mean-reverting. In the long run, prices were anchored by the marginal cost of producing gold. 
In the short run, periods of generalized global inflation following gold discoveries were 
expected to be succeeded by periods of deflation because gold discoveries would increase the 
total world gold stock, and hence the world price level. This, in turn, reduced the real price of 
gold (given the fixed nominal price set by the monetary authorities) and led to lower gold 
production and greater substitution of gold from monetary to non-monetary uses.
9  
Consistent with the belief that prices were mean-reverting, the expected inflation rate hovered 
around zero and long-run price level uncertainty was low (Klein (1975)). This had important 
implications for the stability of nominal interest rates (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), 
especially expectations over long horizons. Expectations about short-term interest rates could 
be more variable. This partly reflected the ability, albeit limited, of monetary authorities to 
offset demand and supply shocks within the target zone provided by the gold points 
framework.
10 In the interwar period and possibly pre-1914, for example, central banks 
engaged in sterilization policies to offset the impact of international gold movements 
(Bloomfield (1959), Dutton (1984), Nurkse (1944)). In addition, some of the effects of 
deflation were offset by the use of key currencies as central bank reserves instead of gold and 
by the increasing use of bank money and convertible fiduciary money as gold substitutes 
(Triffin (1960)).
11
Are the lessons from the gold standard regime still valuable today? Current fiat money 
regimes provide central banks with much more flexibility than a commodity standard regime 
but they lack the self-correcting mechanisms inherent in the gold standard. To be sure, the fiat 
currency regime in the latter half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1970s and early 
1980s, showed little resemblance to the gold standard regime as prices appeared to be 
unmoored. But, recent history has shown that well-designed fiat money regimes can provide 
an effective nominal anchor. The holding power of the anchor in the fiat money regime, 
however, depends on the ability and willingness of the monetary authority to pursue its low 
                                                           
9   It should be noted that in an environment of positive productivity driven real growth there would be a 
tendency towards secular deflation unless offset by technical innovation in gold production or by gold 
discoveries (by contrast, if gold was a depletable, durable resource then steady-state deflation would be 
inevitable (Bordo and Ellson (1985))). 
10   During the gold standard period, gold parity was bounded by the gold points (the cost of shipping gold 
among the various financial centers). Following Svensson (1994), Bordo and MacDonald (2004) show that 
the gold points served as a target zone in the sense of Krugman (1991) and implied some scope for the core 
countries in the gold bloc to temporarily offset real and nominal disturbances such as was the case in 
England, France and Germany. An important feature of the flexibility was that markets believed that the gold 
parity would be preserved under virtually all circumstances. 
11   Smaller countries which lacked financial maturity and credibility had less room for maneuver and hence were 
less able to shield themselves from the full brunt of deflation. Because they had difficulty maintaining the 
convertibility of their currencies, but when they opted for floating they often suffered capital flight. Their 
options were to adopt a currency board arrangement with close to 100% gold reserves or to decouple 
themselves from capital flows. 
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inflation goal. The success of monetary authorities in the past decade to achieve low, stable 
inflation rates around the world has shown that such a regime can work.  
Looking forward, a key policy question is whether such fiat money regimes can be improved 
upon. Some economists have advocated that central banks put further emphasis on price 
stability by adopting “price level” targeting regimes. Proposals for price level targeting 
generally have come in two distinct flavors. One version emphasizes a fixed price level target. 
In this case, a monetary authority would target a given price level at a particular policy 
horizon. If the price level exceeded (or were expected to exceed) the target, the monetary 
authority would tighten policy; and if it fell below target, the monetary authority would ease 
policy. As under the gold standard, this policy would generate alternating periods of transitory 
inflation and deflation. Such an approach would have the advantage of long-run price 
predictability, which conventional inflation targeting regimes do not (Bordo, Dittmar and 
Gavin (2003), Riksbank (2003), Svensson (1999b)). But it could have the disadvantage of 
short-run volatility if downward nominal rigidities were important. In an alternative version 
of the scheme, a monetary authority would target a rising price level – in a sense, this would 
be equivalent to average inflation targeting rather than a conventional period-by-period 
inflation rate target (King (1999)). This approach would still share the favorable feature of 
long-run price predictability. If a shock were to cause the price level to fall below target, then 
the central bank would take an accommodative monetary stance to put upward pressure on 
prices until the price level returned to target. If, however a shock were to cause the price level 
to exceed the target, the central bank would respond by tightening monetary conditions to 
return to target. If the central bank were sufficiently patient towards achieving its target, the 
return of the price level could be achieved without engendering deflation, or at the very least 
minimizing the need to engender deflation. In either variant of price level targeting, the policy 
regime would more closely approximate the workings of the gold standard period, and hence 
enhance the policy relevance of studying the historical record. 
2.3.3.  Deflation spirals, asset prices and credit cycles 
An important monetary policy concern arises from the possibility of deflation spirals – self-
reinforcing waves of downward price pressures. An oft-mentioned mechanism that could 
generate a spiral is consumer expectations. If a deflation were expected, consumers might 
refrain from spending today in the hope of paying lower prices tomorrow. This would lower 
velocity, which in turn would reduce prices, and so on.  
Another, possibly more policy-relevant, mechanism that is thought to be associated with 
spiraling deflation is asset price boom and bust behavior, an issue that has attracted 
considerable attention in recent years.
12 One implication from this literature has been that the 
risks of deflation might be understated in the conventional focus on supply and demand 
shocks. In this scenario, a spectre of deflation may cause forward-looking investors to expect 
a reduction in profits and a general decline of economic activity, especially if the economy is 
subject to downward nominal rigidities. The collapse in asset prices could have a chilling 
effect on economic activity which would then add to the deflationary pressures. This process 
could be reinforced by balance sheet problems of firms and households, who might retrench 
or even renege on debt obligations in bankruptcy (Fisher (1933), Kindleberger (2000), Tobin 
                                                           
12   This view, which has its antecedents in Kindleberger (2000) and Minsky (1982), emphasizes the cumulative 
process of financial imbalances and the possibility that such imbalances may cause sharp, debilitating 
adjustments or crises, which could generate equally sharp, and probably unanticipated, deflation. 
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(1975), Bernanke (1983), Koo (2003), von Peter (2004)). In such a case, the interaction of the 
policy regime, the vagaries of human psychology and the economic environment would 
conspire to generate a perverse disequilibrium. And, of course, such developments would 
have the potential of distorting the monetary transmission mechanism, which in turn would 
have implications for velocity.  
Credit cycles, often associated with excessive leveraging of financial assets, appear to be 
empirically linked to the incidence of booms and busts (Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2002b, 
2004), Borio and White (2004)). In one variant of the view, an initial productivity boom 
would engender overconfidence amongst various agents in the economy. Loan demand would 
rise rapidly as confident investors reach for higher and higher perceived risk-adjusted yields. 
The early stages of such a boom might be self-reinforcing as perceptions of risks became 
increasingly exuberant. Credit supply would also be spurred on as risks would appear, at least 
initially, low. If the boom continued, and the optimistic scenario materialized, all might be 
well. But, if the productivity gains disappoint the high expectations, the economy would 
likely retrench. And, if leverage were sufficiently excessive, the retrenchment could cascade 
into a self-reinforcing contraction. Price pressures would likely fall as inside money would 
plummet. Real debt service burdens would increase, asset qualities would decline, 
bankruptcies would inevitably ensue and the potential for banking and financial crises would 
arise. Although these types of forces have been experienced in the distant past, they have also 
been relevant in the past decade. In some sense, such boom and bust cycles may be thought of 
as a permanent feature of the policy environment going forward (Borio, English and Filardo 
(2004)).  
For good reason, the general consensus among policy makers and economists is that 
deflationary spirals should be avoided. The empirical question is how best to avoid them. For 
insights into answers to this, as well as to other important questions, we turn to the historical 
record. 
3.  LOOKING BACK AT THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
We argue that, historically, deflation was viewed in a more positive light. The reason why, we 
believe, reflects the experience in the pre-World War I deflationary environment and beliefs 
about the importance of having a strong nominal anchor to maximize private sector 
performance. We note with some cautious optimism that the recent inflation and output 
behavior in the United States, amongst others, may indicate the emergence of a sea change in 
thinking about the true costs and benefits of price stability. Even though deflation may be a 
lower target than most would be comfortable with at this time, recent inflation outcomes – 
especially when factoring in a statistical bias – are much lower than some would have thought 
prudent just a decade ago. 
In this section, we examine both the historical and statistical record to understand the costs of 
deflation. One important advantage in looking to the experience of the distant past is that it 
provides a clearer perspective on deflation behavior. In history, deflation has often coincided 
with robust economic growth (Table 2).
13 This is in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom 
that generally is drawn from a more limited focus on deflation in Japan in the 1990s and 
                                                           
13  See Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), Bordo, Landon-Lane and Redish (2004), Bordo and Redish (2004), and 
Borio and Filardo (2004) for alternative ways to measure the positive association between output and 
deflation. 
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deflation episodes in the Great Depression. This section takes a closer look into historical 
deflations to better understand the determinants of the different types of deflation. 
3.1. Historical  narrative: evidence from the nineteenth century 
As we discussed above, the historical record is a comparatively fertile environment to study 
deflation because price level declines were much more frequent in the long century ending 
with 1914. Alternating waves of inflation and deflation were an integral part of the 
commodity-based classical gold standard regime with a general tendency for falling prices 
from the 1820s to the mid 1840s; then rising prices following the Californian and Australian 
gold discoveries in the late 1840s until the early 1870s; then deflation from 1873 to 1896; and 
finally inflation from 1897-1914 following gold discoveries in South Africa and Alaska. This 
section explores some historical episodes of different types of deflation in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
3.1.1.  1873-1896: a good deflation that turned somewhat bad 
The 1873-1896 episode is a clear example of a “good deflation” when prices fell in many 
countries by about 2% per year, accompanied by growth of about 2-3% per year (Bordo, 
Landon-Lane and Redish (2004)). Deflation in that era was driven by both a productivity 
boom (reflecting the “second industrial or mechanical revolution and the proliferation of 
railroads across the world (Crafts (2000)), and by a number of major countries (Germany, 
Netherlands, Belgium and Scandinavia in the early 1870s and France later) joining the gold 
standard.  
Although secular deflation was accompanied by positive growth, it was controversial because 
of its distributional consequences. Groups whose real incomes fell, such as debtors, farmers or 
those whose real incomes were perceived to have fallen in an age before price indices, 
complained bitterly and engaged in often disruptive social and political agitation.
14 In the 
United States, this was manifested in the free silver movement and the rise of organized labor. 
In Europe it appeared in the growth of both labor unions and labor political parties and in a 
demand for tariff protection by agricultural groups. 
Although real output grew on average in the deflation episode of 1873-1896 in most 
countries, growth was punctuated by several recessions (1873-1875, 1884-1885, 1890-1896), 
the worst of which was the last – which may even possibly be characterized as bad. It began 
with the Baring Crisis of 1890 when Argentina defaulted on its debt. This shock led to 
banking crises (and stock market crashes) in London, elsewhere on the continent and the 
United States and other parts of Latin America, especially Brazil (Bordo and Murshid (2003), 
Triner (2003)). Recession was further aggravated by a wave of banking panics which began in 
the United States in 1893 and spread to Europe (especially Italy) and Australia (Bordo and 
Eichengreen (1999)). 
3.1.2.  1837-1843: bad deflation 
An earlier nineteenth century episode of deflation from 1837-1843, often viewed as bad, 
began with financial crises in London and the Continent (Kindleberger (2000)) and especially 
in the United States in 1837. Another wave of crises occurred in 1839. In the United States, 
                                                           
14  Discontent seems to have been less when nominal wages continued to rise than when they fell, although real 
wages rose in both circumstances (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)). 
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debate still swirls over whether the crisis and deflation reflected the “Bank War”, the struggle 
between President Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle, President of the Second Bank of the 
United States (an early central bank) (Rousseau (2003), Wallis (2003)) or events in Europe 
such as a series of bad harvest failures in England, which led to the importation of wheat from 
the continent and a drain on the Bank of England’s gold reserves leading it to raise its 
discount rate and precipitate capital flight from periphery countries, especially the United 
States (Temin (1969)).
15 The annual data for this period may be subject to some questions 
about their accuracy. For example, although prices fell by 5.6% in the United States, 2.1% in 
the United Kingdom and 2.0% in France, narratives by contemporary observers viewed the 
episode as one of serious recession (Thorp (1926)). Available measures of real GDP show an 
increase in the United States of 3.9% and of 1.3% in France. The United Kingdom, in 
contrast, experienced a real GDP decline of 2.6%.
16
3.2. Historical  narrative: evidence from the twentieth century 
3.2.1.  1919-1921: bad, possibly ugly for some, deflation 
During the immediate post-World War I period, there was a short period of downward price 
movement in many countries that corresponded with a global contraction in economic 
activity. For example, annual GDP fell on a peak-to-trough basis by 18% in the United States, 
29% in the United Kingdom, 20% in Germany, 24% in Canada. Moreover, these years were 
also accompanied by considerable volatility in output.
17 Given the poor output performance, 
these deflations would be characterized as “bad”. The serious recession and deflation, many 
would argue, was engineered by tight monetary policies followed by the Federal Reserve, 
Bank of England, Banque de France and other monetary authorities in countries dedicated to 
rolling back the high inflation created during World War I and restoring the pre-war gold 
parity. The expectations of such policies and their likely effects also contributed to the 
deflationary environment. The collapse in aggregate demand appeared mostly in falling 
prices, which had increased rapidly during and after the war as a consequence of both wartime 
scarcity and speculation. It is, however, interesting to note that although real output declined 
significantly, the decline was not out of line with the experience of earlier severe cyclical 
contractions (Zarnowitz (1992)).
18
                                                           
15  It is also useful to note that Jackson, a populist, strongly opposed the Second bank under Biddle for its 
alleged monopoly power over the US banking system. 
16   Without a doubt, the farther one pushes back in history, the less confidence one should have in data for GDP. 
However, using industrial production estimates from Davis (2002) for the United States corroborates that 
there is little evidence of a significant production slowdown during this period. 
17   At a higher data frequency in the United States, for example, the unemployment rate rose from 4% in 1920 to 
12% in 1921, and industrial production fell 23% (Meltzer (2003)); at the same time, the GNP deflator fell 
28% from peak to trough (based on quarterly data from Balke and Gordon (1986)). 
18  To be sure, demobilization could have contributed to the severity of the recession. Further analysis of this 
episode is left for future research because of the difficulty of parsing out the various post-war demobilization 
effects from the policy effects. In addition, the volatility and short duration of the episode complicates the 
analysis using annual data. 
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3.2.2.  1921-1929: good deflation 
The 1920s period represents an example of a good deflation, preceded, as discussed above, by 
serious recession in many countries in 1919-1921. The rest of the twenties – “the roaring 
twenties” – observed rapid real growth in many countries (with the principal exception of the 
United Kingdom mired in a 20-year stagnation) punctuated by two very mild recessions. The 
period also exhibited mild deflation of 1-2%. Many attribute the 1920s prosperity to a post-
war recovery and the proliferation of new “high tech” industries such as automobiles, 
telephones, radios and refrigerators (White (1990)); Graph 1 illustrates the importance of 
positive supply shocks during this period. The resolution of the post-war reparations and war 
debt problems in the late twenties, the renewal of international trade with the end of post-war 
restrictions and the renewal of international capital movements after the major belligerents 
stabilized their currencies and the gold exchange standard was restored in 1925, and extensive 
direct and portfolio flows from the United States to Europe (especially Germany) and to Latin 
America played important roles in spreading the prosperity worldwide (Bordo, Eichengreen 
and Irwin (1999)).
19
3.2.3. 1929-1933  (the  Great  Contraction): an ugly deflation 
The contraction of 1929-1933 was characterized by both drastic declines in real output (for 
example, United States -7.6%, Canada -8.4%, Germany -2.7%, United Kingdom -1.0% and 
France -2.2%) and deflation (United States -6.8%, Canada -6.2%, Germany -5.7%, United 
Kingdom -3.8% and France -4.4%). Indeed, the size of the output decline associated with this 
episode was generally much larger than comparable deflations during other periods (Graph 2). 
In addition, more of the contraction of aggregate demand went into output than into prices and 
nominal wages than in 1919-1921, reflecting in large part the presence of important structural 
rigidities (Bordo, Erceg and Evans (1997), Hanes and James (2001), O’Brien (1989)). 
A voluminous literature exists on the episode. The current consensus view is that the 
contraction was caused by monetary forces in the United States. The Federal Reserve began 
tightening monetary policy in early 1928 to help moderate the Wall Street stock market boom 
which had been underway since 1926. The Federal Reserve was wedded to the real bills 
doctrine which proscribed bank lending to finance speculative activity (Meltzer (2003)). 
Deflationary pressure was enhanced by the Banque de France which was following a 
deliberate gold sterilization policy of gold inflows induced by France’s return to the gold 
standard in 1926 at a greatly depreciated and undervalued parity (Eichengreen (1992)). Tight 
money then precipitated a recession beginning in August 1929 and the stock market crash in 
October. Most commentators today believe that the crash was not the main cause of the Great 
Contraction which followed (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Romer (1992)) but it did 
contribute heavily to the first years of serious recession, 1929-1930. The transformation of a 
serious recession in the United States in 1929-30 into the Great Contraction is universally 
attributed to a series of banking panics beginning in October 1930 which were unchecked by 
expansionary Federal Reserve actions (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)).
20
                                                           
 
19   Sargent (1986b) points to the Poincaré miracle as evidence that sound monetary and fiscal reforms during the 
time allowed France to engineer a relatively costless stabilization of prices, returning the country to the gold 
standard albeit at an 80% depreciation of the Franc. 
20   The Friedman and Schwartz hypothesis has been supported over the years by considerable research. Bordo, 
Choudhri and Schwartz (1995), for example, present simulations which show that had the Federal Reserve 
followed expansionary monetary policies to offset the effects of the banking panics on money supply that the 
great contraction could have been avoided. A recent paper by Christiano et al (2004) which is based on 
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The contraction was then transmitted to the rest of the world via the fixed exchange rate 
linkages of the gold standard and by “golden fetters” which prevented the monetary 
authorities of gold standard adherents from following the expansionary policies needed to 
offset collapsing demand and a rash of banking panics across the world (Bernanke and James 
(1991)), without triggering a speculative attack on the gold parity (Temin (1989), Eichengreen 
(1992)). 
The Great Contraction ended by 1933 in most countries except the gold bloc (France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia) which suffered 
depression until they left gold in 1935-1936. Once countries cut the link with the gold 
standard, they were able to follow expansionary monetary policies to reflate and recover 
(Bernanke (1995), Choudhri and Kochin (1980), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Eichengreen 
(1992), Temin (1989)). 
The process began with the United Kingdom leaving gold in September 1931 followed by two 
dozen other countries linked to sterling. The United States suffered depression until March 
1933; recovery involved expansionary gold purchases by the US Treasury and devaluation of 
the dollar. 
Debate continues over the propagation mechanisms of the contraction in the United States, 
whether it was via sticky nominal wages (Bernanke and Carey (1996), Bordo, Erceg and 
Evans (2000)), financial disintermediation (Bernanke (1983)), rising real interest rates 
(Schwartz (1981)), and debt deflation (Fisher (1933)). 
The experience of the Great Contraction has colored subsequent views on deflation but the 
historical record suggests that it is “sui generis”. There is no clear cut evidence on the role of 
deflation in making the Great Contraction great. We do not know conclusively if falling prices 
worsened the recession via Irving Fisher’s (1933) debt deflation process (Bernanke and James 
(1991)) or whether the problem was that prices did not fall enough to clear markets as seems 
to have been the case in 1919-21. Thus in our work we do not place the Great Depression at 
center stage in our analysis of deflation but rather we focus on the other experiences with 
deflation because we view the Great Contraction as special. 
3.2.4.  1937-38 and 1948-1949: 2 episodes of bad deflation and the zero nominal 
bound 
Meltzer (1999) documents two recessions in US history characterized both by falling prices 
and by extremely low interest rates. The recession of 1937-38 was one of the most severe 
recessions of the twentieth century, characterized by an 18% decline in GNP from peak to 
trough and the unemployment rate reaching 20%. Prices declined about 5% from the 
quarterly GNP deflator peak in the third quarter of 1937 to the trough in the second quarter of 
1939. It was triggered, according to Friedman and Schwartz by a doubling of reserve 
requirements by the Federal Reserve, beginning in 1936. Other factors include a tight fiscal 
policy stance by the Roosevelt administration. Short-term interest rates in this episode ranged 
between 0.03% and 0.5%. Meltzer demonstrates that real interest rates and the real monetary 
base were highly correlated in this episode reflecting the common influence of deflation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
simulations of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the US economy in the Great 
depression reaches the same conclusion. Moreover, Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (2002) and Hsieh and 
Romer (2001) present evidence that the Federal Reserve would have been able to follow these expansionary 
policies without being constrained by its gold reserves as had been argued earlier by Eichengreen (1992). 
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Real interest rates were perversely related to the evolution of real output whereas movements 
in real money balances seem to explain well the pace of both recession and recovery. This 
evidence, he argues, strengthens the case for using monetary aggregates as the major policy 
instrument when interest rates reach the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates. A similar 
pattern is observed in the much milder post-World War II recession of 1948-49 which also 
exhibited falling prices with short-term rates still pegged close to zero. Again, movements in 
the real base track the real economy whereas real interest rates do not. 
3.2.5.  Modest deflation in the mid-twentieth century 
In the immediate post-World War II era and 1950s, several countries exhibited some 
proclivities toward very short periods of deflation. In general, the episodes were short-lived 
when compared to the interwar or pre-1914 period. This may have been a normal aspect of 
cyclical experience over most of the period before World War II when business cycles 
typically showed both output and price levels moving procyclically (Cagan (1979), Zarnowitz 
(1992)). After the mid-1960s, however, we observe a positive price trend in most countries, 
and, over the business cycle, the pattern of price movements has changed from procyclical 
levels to procyclical inflation rates. It is only since the return to a low inflation environment in 
the past 15 years, similar in many respects to the environment that prevailed for much of the 
preceding century and a half, that the spectre of deflation has reemerged. 
3.2.6.  Summary: the historical setting in which deflations occur  
Most of the historical deflationary episodes that we document occurred under some variant of 
the gold standard. Moreover, the episodes of deflation that occurred in fiat money regimes 
were during periods of postwar resumption to the gold standard. 
Under the gold standard, deflation was generally of the good variety reflecting positive 
aggregate supply shocks. When they turned bad it was mainly because of banking crises 
aggravating the effects of negative aggregate demand shocks. Such crises in large part 
reflected the fragility of early banking systems (and financial markets) in an environment of 
asymmetric information, poor governance and, above all, the absence of a lender of last 
resort. Such episodes generally ended when the forces driving the crisis naturally subsided or 
when some lender of last resort intervened. 
Bad deflations were also associated with disinflations after various wars when monetary 
authorities following the classical orthodoxy pursued the tight monetary and fiscal policies 
needed to return to gold convertibility at the original parity. Such episodes occurred twice in 
British monetary history, after the Napoleonic wars (Bordo and White (1991)) and, as 
mentioned above, after World War I. In the United States, this was also the case in 1920-21. 
However after its Civil War, apart from a deliberate contractionary policy which lasted a year 
following the Contraction Act of 1866, the twelve years of deflation prior to the successful 
resumption on January 1, 1879 was best characterized as being benign, reflecting the US 
Treasury’s pursuit of a policy allowing the real economy to grow up to a constant money 
supply (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)). 
The deflation of the 1920s and 1930s were also associated with a variant of the gold 
standard—the interwar gold exchange standard, in which the world’s fiduciary money supply 
was a multiple of the gold base. The money-to-gold multiplier in each country was the 
product of the ratio of international reserves (gold reserves plus foreign exchange) to gold 
reserves, the ratio of the monetary base to gold, and the money multiplier (the ratio of money 
supply to the base). As Bernanke (1995) demonstrates, this leveraged situation increased the 
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danger for a drastic deflation as did occur from 1928 to 1933. The massive world wide 
deflation, according to him, reflected the confluence of three key forces which were alluded to 
in section 3.2.2: a scramble for gold as authorities liquidated foreign exchange reserves, a 
contraction of the monetary base to preserve gold and disintermediation by the banking 
system. 
There seem to be very few historical episodes of deflation under a fiat money regime which 
were not in any way linked to a commodity nominal anchor. Sweden successfully followed a 
price norm in the 1930’s, gearing its monetary policy to stabilize a price index. In many 
respects, this was an attempt to mimic the price stabilization features of the gold standard 
while eliminating the volatility produced by shocks to the gold market, as advocated by 
Fisher, Wicksell and Marshall (Bordo (1984), Berg and Jonung (1999), Fregert and Jonung 
(2001)). Presumably, a credible commitment to such a policy could anchor expectations in a 
way similar to adherence to a commodity standard. Whether the recent deflationary 
experience can be characterized as a serious source of concern may reflect, among other 
things, the extent to which the nominal anchor is perceived to be as strong as was the case 
under the pre-1914 gold standard. 
3.3. Statistical  analysis of deflation 
3.3.1. Deflation  episodes 
Table 2 presents statistics from past deflationary episodes, focusing on the size of the price 
decline from peak to trough, the duration of each episode and the size of the largest one-year 
decline during each episode. In contrast to Table 1 which provided an analysis of deflation 
with an annual frequency, this table emphasizes more persistent deflationary episodes. 
In contrast to the pattern exhibited in recent decades, long periods of deflation were fairly 
prevalent. The mean peak-to-trough decline for these episodes was -4.2%. The average 
duration was 5.4 years. What is particularly important to note is that some of the annual 
declines in the price level were rather large – in many cases, double digit one-year declines 
were not uncommon. Of course, the average bundle of consumer goods a century or so ago 
was relatively dominated by commodities rather than services as is true today. As a 
consequence, the wide price swings of the past may be more of a reflection of the 
consumption basket of the past than an indication of the magnitude of price volatility to be 
expected in today’s low inflation environment. 
The table also shows quite clearly that deflation episodes were not always associated with a 
contraction in output. In fact, deflations associated with output contractions were rather rare. 
Graph 2 highlighted this stylized fact and showed that deep deflations were mostly 
concentrated in the Great Depression period. Nonetheless, the extreme experiences of the 
Great Depression arguably still shape – rightly or wrongly – the concerns of the public and 
policymakers.  
3.3.2. Asymmetric  persistence of deflation and inflation 
Table 3 shows that inflation persistence was generally low in the early period, rose 
significantly in the twentieth century and then recently fell. This hump-shaped time-series 
pattern is consistent with the unit root tests on the historical data; the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century inflation data exhibit stationarity, the Great Inflation period is 
consistent with more persistent changes in inflation rates as would be suggested by a unit root 
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process, and in the past decade there is some evidence that inflation rates have generally 
become more stationary.
21
This low-persistence behavior in the distant past was, of course, consistent with the monetary 
regime implied by the gold standard, both for the core and periphery countries.
22 Any bursts 
of inflation or deflation were naturally reversed in short order because of the rules of the 
game. And, the recent time-series behavior of inflation, as well as the greater frequency of 
deflation, suggests that the current monetary policy environment has begun to resemble more 
that of the distant past than that of the past 40 years. 
Another informative comparison of the time-series behavior of persistence addresses whether 
the size of persistence is deflation dependent. Was transitory deflation more persistent than 
transitory inflation, as theories emphasizing nominal rigidities would suggest? If downward 
nominal rigidities were significant in a macroeoconomic sense, an initial deflation would 
interact with the rigidities to draw out the economic adjustment compared to a similiarly-sized 
inflation. To test this possibility of asymmetry, a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model of 
inflation (π) is adapted from Enders and Granger (1998). 
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We find little evidence to suggest that deflation was any more persistent than inflation for the 
pre-1913 period (Table 4). The mean value of the persistence parameter for all the countries 
in the sample during deflation periods is 0.05 versus 0.15 during inflationary periods. So, if 
anything, the persistence during deflations was less than the persistence in inflations. One 
interpretation of these results is that there is little role for downward nominal rigidities, at 
least during the pre-1913 period. This would also suggest that to the extent that downward 
nominal rigidities were not important, modest deflations during this period were likely to be 
no more costly than modest inflations.
23
Applying this interpretation to the current monetary policy environment may be subject to 
many caveats because of obvious differences in the economic environments then and now. 
For example, some of the differences would include the nature of wage and price rigidities, 
the importance of debt deflation and the nature of the anchored inflationary expectations. To 
examine the possible implications for the current period, we apply an analogous method to the 
Great Inflation period with one key difference. Rather than focusing on periods of inflation 
and deflation, we examine periods when inflation was above and below its trend. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the results in Table 5 are rather similar to those in Table 4. The hypothesis tests 
generally show that negative and positive deviations of inflation around trend exhibit 
                                                           
21   These results are consistent with those of Borio and Filardo (2004), which provides various alternative 
snapshots of the persistence of inflation in the historical record. 
22   See also Burdekin and Siklos (1999, 2004) for further detail on some of the differences between the core and 
periphery countries. 
23  Applying these same methods to the immediate post-World War I period is complicated because episodic 
nonstationarities or other data problems: hyperinflation in some countries, adverse effects of price controls in 
others during the 1930s and 1940s and some missing data. Some of these factors may be responsible for 
generating behavior consistent with unit roots. In general, for the cases where the data are less likely to have 
been unduly influenced by episodic nonstationarities, the evidence for asymmetry is weak. 
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symmetric persistence. If anything, positive deviations, again, are more persistent than the 
negative ones. The mean persistence is 0.33 for negative deviations and 0.54 for positive 
deviations. 
3.3.3.  Further investigations into asymmetry 
We check the robustness of the symmetry results in the country-by-country analysis for the 
gold standard period using panel estimation methods. Table 6 summarizes the results from 
two groupings of countries. The first grouping is the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The quality of the data is likely to be the highest for these countries. They also represent two 
key economies in the gold standard period. The second grouping is for the G10 countries. 
This provides a larger sample with which to improve the accuracy of the analysis. Another 
key difference between this test and the previous one is that we include additional regressors 
that may alter our interpretations of the key factors influencing inflation.
24
The statistical model of inflation is  
t i t t t i t t i i t i X I I K , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 , ) 1 ( ε β π ρ π ρ π + + − + + = − − − , 
where the model is estimated using a pooled regression (unbalanced panel). In this equation, π 
is the annual inflation rate in country i, Ki is a country specific constant, and X are a set of 
economic variables associated with inflation determination.   is a heaviside indicator 
function as defined above. The error term is assumed to be distributed normally.  
t I
The estimation methodology is straightforward. If the country constants were statistically 
different at the 95% confidence level, we estimated the model with fixed effects; otherwise, 
we used a common constant. In nearly all the cases, we could not reject the hypothesis that all 
the country constants were equal to each other. This should not be a great surprise given the 
nature of the gold standard and its strong nominal anchor on all the countries under 
consideration.  
The hypothesis of symmetry of the inflation process was tested again by comparing  1 ρ  and 
2 ρ . The evidence is quite clear for both groupings: there is no statistically significant 
evidence that the inflation process is asymmetric. This suggests, as noted above, if there were 
downward nominal rigidities at the microeconomic level during the gold standard period, they 
did not exhibit a macroeconomic impact on the inflation process.
25 The other regressors, X, 
                                                           
 
24   One might interpret this as a reduced form Phillips curve specification.  
25  In this sense, these results would be consistent with those in Lebow, Wascher and Stockton (1995) where 
they cannot find statistically-significant evidence of nonlinearity of the type that would be implied by the 
downward nominal rigidity model of Akerlof et al (1996). Such evidence is supported more generally. 
McLaughlin (1994, 1999, 2000) argues that standard wage skewness measures may be poor reflections of the 
degree of downward wage rigidity. Using the Panel of Income Dynamics, he finds that there is little thinning 
of the wage change distribution below zero in the United States. Using a different criterion, Kimura and Ueda 
(2001) found scant evidence of downward wage rigidity using Japan’s Monthly Labour Survey data through 
2000 – even though such rigidity was evident in an earlier study with a different dataset. This evidence 
suggests that there might not be particular gains to targeting a positive inflation rate in order to “grease the 
wheels”. In contrast, other research by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003), Lebow, Stockton and Wascher (1995), 
Altonji and Devereux (1999) and others have found some evidence of downward wage rigidity. In general 
this is an important issue, but it should be pointed out that these studies also find evidence of nominal wage 
cuts and an increased likelihood of wage cuts as the inflation rate declines. Whether the skewness of wage 
distributions is sufficient to have meaningful macroeconomic consequences remains an open question, the 
recent experience suggests that rigidities might not be as important as once thought, in part because of lower 
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included in the regression are the first lag of the country-specific annual growth rate of 
money, the output gap, supply shocks, demand shocks, a banking crisis variable and the 
annual growth rate of real equity prices (see footnote in the table for further details). In 
general, they have plausible, economically-meaningful signs, with the lagged of the money 
growth variable being the most significant. Their inclusion did not change the robustness of 
the symmetry result. 
3.3.4. Statistical  determinants of the good, the bad and the ugly deflations 
This section investigates the determinants of the good, the bad and the ugly deflations as a 
means to delve further into the nature of deflation in the distant past. Using information from 
both the historical narratives and the quantitative measures from the historical dataset, each 
deflationary episode in Table 2 is classified as being either a good, bad or ugly deflation.
26 
This classification is then analyzed using an ordered probit model, employing various 
economic factors that might help to distinguish the conditions most likely to produce one of 
the types of deflation. It is important to note that deflation in this model is a persistent peak-
to-trough decline in aggregate prices. 
In the empirical model, the dependent variable can take one of three values which correspond 















Assuming a latent variable formulation of the model, the latent variable  * λ  is described in 
terms of observable variables X as 
e X + = β λ*  
where e is assumed to have a Normal distribution with a mean of zero and a given standard 
deviation (see Appendix for further details). In this way, the probability of being in the good, 
the bad and the ugly deflations can be easily assessed given observations on X. 
The observable variables, X, are chosen based on availability and on their relevance in 
possibly playing a role in determining whether a particular deflation will be of the good, the 
bad or the ugly type. They include monetary aggregates, the percent deviation of the price 
level from a steady-state price level (P*) based on the quantity theory, a banking crisis 
indicator variable, supply and demand shocks estimated using a Blanchard-Quah 
decomposition described in the previous section, real wage inflation, interest rates and the 
growth rate of real equity prices. 
To emphasize the lead-lag distinction between the regressors and the indicator of deflation 
types, we use five-year averages of the observable variables prior to the start of the deflation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
inflation rates and also because of less union power in labor markets. Looking farther back in time, Hanes 
(1993) finds that nominal wage flexibility generally fell since 1880. This raises the possibility that the costs 
of deflation were smaller during the gold standard period.  
26  The classification was based primarily on the peak-to-trough output losses during each episode, and then 
cross-referenced with the historical narratives. In general, double-digit declines were necessary but not 
sufficient condition to qualify as “ugly”; those episodes with declines not categorized as ugly were 
considered “bad”. 
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In this way, we minimize the possibility of reverse causation. In the case of banking crises, for 
example, we rule out the possible feedback from debt deflation to banking crises because we 
only take account of banking crises that precede the peak in the price level. 
While the explanatory variables have various possible interpretations as to their economic 
significance, we would like to highlight our views of what the (lagged) explanatory variables 
might be explaining. The monetary aggregates and the P* variables capture a monetarist view 
of the inflation process. The rapid growth of the monetary aggregates in the period before a 
price peak is likely to put upward pressure on prices and, as a result, on the gold parity 
constraint. The adjustment process during the gold standard period would generally generate 
conditions fostering deflation. Likewise, the gap between the price level and P* before a price 
peak could be capturing deviations of prices from the nominal anchor and would likely 
prompt an adjustment over time; the larger the gap, the sharper the likely adjustment. Supply 
and demand shocks are closely related to possible channels determining whether a deflation is 
good or bad, as argued above. Real wage inflation, while reflecting supply and demand 
conditions, could serve as a proxy for nominal rigidities; if nominal wages exhibited 
downward nominal rigidities, high real wage growth would likely exacerbate the subsequent 
adjustment process. The interest rate could also be picking up some cross country differences 
in financial conditions vis-à-vis the underlying monetary conditions implied by the gold 
standard. The banking crises variable offers a measurement of the possible link between 
deflation and financial crises. 
The results are generally supportive of the monetarist view that monetary conditions are 
important determinants of the different types of deflation (Table 7). On the one hand, the 
cross-sectional bivariate correlation between money growth and the probabilities of the good, 
the bad and the ugly deflations is not particularly high at .04, but is statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level. Its (pseudo-)R
2 is fairly low at 5%. On the other hand, the P* gap 
appears to be an important determinant of the different types of deflation, especially when the 
banking crisis indicator is included in the estimated model. Model 3, for example, explains 
24% of the cross-sectional variation, and the model parameters are significant at the 95% 
confidence level. These variables generate consistent correlations for nearly all the relevant 
specifications in the table. It is also useful to examine the in-sample fit of the models. The 
middle panel provides such information. In general, the P* and banking crisis variables 
account for many of the good deflations – since the crisis variable is generally 0 for the good 
deflations, this suggests a particularly strong role for the P* variable. In addition, it is useful 
to examine the results of models 7 and 9 when the number of deflation episodes falls to just 
under two dozen. In these cases, the role of the real wage growth and real equity prices has 
less to do with their explanatory power than with the fact that data availability cuts down the 
number of useable data points. The bottom line is that the P* and crisis variables are able to 
explain at least two dozen deflationary episodes quite well. 
One way to gauge the importance of the crisis variable is to examine its marginal effect of the 
probability of being in the good, the bad and the ugly deflations. In the bottom panel, we look 
at the marginal effect in model 4. The results are striking. If there is no banking crisis, the 
probability of the good, the bad and the ugly deflations are .93, .06 and .01 respectively. If a 
crisis, the probability of a good deflation drops dramatically to .38, while the probabilities of a 
bad and ugly rise considerably. 
The other explanatory variables in the table provide marginal predictive content but, in 
general, the contribution is not statistically significant. The coefficients have intuitively 
plausible signs. For example, the bigger the supply shock, the more likely a good deflation 
would occur (hence the negative coefficient). The greater the increase in demand shocks and 
real wages, all else the same, reduces the likelihood of a subsequent good deflation, a result 
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consistent with cyclical price behavior. Equity prices have the same sign as the supply shocks, 
suggesting that real equity prices may reflect the likelihood of a favorable supply side 
phenomena, and hence raise the likelihood of a good deflation. But, as mentioned above, the 
statistical significance of these variables is rather low, especially when compared to the P* 
and banking crisis variables. 
3.3.5.  Deflation and the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates 
The historical record on interest rates offers some interesting, yet in many ways troubling, 
stylized facts. A robust finding from looking back at nominal interest rates is that rates were 
remarkably stable despite wide swings in inflation/deflation. This is true across countries, 
across different levels of financial maturity, across maturities of interest rates and across time 
during the pre-interwar period. Graph 3 illustrates these stylized facts. Great Britain and 
France surely had some of the most developed financial markets during the 19
th century. 
Norway and the United States were emerging market economies early on but later caught up. 
The story looks very similar for short-term and long-term rates across all these experiences – 
interest rates simply did not vary much. 
The historical record on interest rates also has implications for other aspects of the conduct of 
monetary policy. As is discussed elsewhere, the stability of nominal interest rates in the face 
of wide swings in inflation/deflation is closely related to the long literature on the Gibson 
paradox – the finding that nominal interest rate movements were more correlated with the 
price level than with the rate of inflation during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
27 
Explanations for such behavior generally rely on sluggish expectation updating (Klein 
(1975)), which is related to the “information technology” during the distant past as well as the 
incentives inherent in the gold standard regime to generate mean-reverting inflation 
expectations.
28 If true, then the return to a stronger nominal anchor as has been the trend in the 
past decade may usher in a new era of more sluggish expectation formation, which could have 
important implications for the stability of empirically-oriented Taylor-type interest rate rules 
for monetary policy making as well as of velocity of the monetary aggregates. 
Of additional importance to our discussion is the fact that nominal interest rates rarely hit the 
zero lower bound for nominal interest rates in the pre-war and pre-interwar periods, again 
despite evidence of periods with quite steep deflation rates. This implies that liquidity traps 
were not of prime importance during these periods. Of course, the 1930s as well as recent 
experience in Japan and Switzerland provide ample evidence that nominal interest rates can 
fall quite low and in many cases hit the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates (English 
                                                           
27  Friedman and Schwartz (1982) and Cagan (1984) provide a detailed review of the issues, highlighting the 
empirical investigations into the Gibson paradox. 
28  The information technology argument is described in Borio and Filardo (2004). In addition, the historical 
record suggests that the speed of expectation updating was a function of the inflation regime. Regimes with 
low credibility such as the regime during the Great Inflation would provide incentives for rapid updating; to 
not do so would be very costly. Regimes with high credibility and a strong nominal anchor would provide 
incentives to update less frequently. This view is consistent with the recent empirical evidence presented by 
Bordo and Haubrich (2004) indicating that term structure spreads are poorer predictors of recessions during 
more credible monetary regimes. In addition, the importance of the regime is corroborated using a less 
model-dependent approach by the fact that returns on gold bonds (ie bonds that paid off in gold) never 
diverged much from the returns on paper bonds during the Greenback inflation/deflation episode following 
the US Civil War, during which the price level doubled and subsequently halved (Freidman and Schwartz 
(1963)). 
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(2000)).
29 This evidence does not necessarily imply the existence of liquidity traps, however, 
because the zero bound is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a 
liquidity trap. On this issue, the historical evidence suggests that the presence of liquidity 
traps is highly elusive. Indeed, Meltzer (1999) and Hanes (2004) have recently argued that in 
the 1930s, in what is generally considered the prototypical example of a liquidity trap, the US 
in fact did not one.
30
Moving from the facts to the more risky business of interpretation, if it is true that liquidity 
traps are sufficiently rare, the implication of the recent theoretical literature on monetary 
policy and liquidity traps takes on much less practical significance. Consequently, central 
banks may become persuaded that they need to be less wary about the prospect of ugly 
deflations and hence be less reluctant to lower their inflation targets. It also may mean that 
more conventional monetary policy instruments are sufficient to deal with a range of 
deflationary environments. We discuss the options in more detail in the next section. 
4.  INFLATION, DEFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY: THE ZONAL 
APPROACH 
The historical record has provided a wide range of experiences from which to draw some 
conclusions about the usefulness of monetary policy. In this section we offer a new holistic 
approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy framework. In general, history 
shows that the appropriate framework depends on the inflation circumstances or, more 
precisely, the inflation zone in which a central bank finds itself. The zones span the spectrum 
from high inflation to deep deflation; for a visual summary of this view, see Graph 4. We 
discuss each zone and its implications for monetary policy tradeoffs, in turn, emphasizing 
what we have learned from the historical record. It is also important to emphasize that to learn 
from history, we have to be careful about extrapolating linearly from the past to the present. 
In a sense, a corrective lens may be necessary at times to view the past clearly. In this section, 
we remain cognizant of some factors that may be useful in translating the lessons from the 
past for the future. 
4.1.  Zone 1: high inflation 
Zone 1 is characterized by high and volatile inflation, as experienced in Latin America during 
much of the twentieth century, as well as in infamous European cases of hyperinflation during 
the interwar period. These episodes provide the clearest example of Friedman’s dictum: 
inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon (McCandless and Weber (1995)). 
The prescription to avoid or escape such circumstances seems simple enough – reduce and 
stabilize the growth rate of money. Such a simple policy has often been complicated by 
political pressures to raise revenues from monetary creation (the seigniorage motive). Hence, 
to keep high and volatile inflation from reappearing, successful monetary reforms have 
                                                           
29   Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland (2004) and Borio and Filardo (2004) offer simulations to suggest that the 
zero lower bound of interest rates is more likely when steady-state inflation rates fall. Even so, the evidence 
from counterfactual simulations suggests that the probability of hitting the zero lower bound in the pre-1914 
period was quite low even if the preference for stabilization in the late twentieth century was in place in the 
distant past. 
30  It is important to note that Meltzer (1999) follows up on the earlier study by Brunner and Meltzer (1968). 
Orphanides (2003) reinforces these findings by examining the minutes of the FOMC in the 1930s. 
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generally gone hand in hand with fiscal reforms (Sargent (1986a)). Such monetary reforms 
historically have included provisions to slow the rate of money growth and to ensure more 
central bank operational independence.
31
Moreover, a package of tight money and fiscal balance can be further enhanced if anchored 
by a credible commitment mechanism to stabilize inflationary expectations with the 
concomitant effect of stabilizing velocity. Words alone are not sufficient in such a zone. 
Words must be backed up with actions. History has shown how to design successful private 
and public arrangements. In the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, 
arrangements included adhering to the gold standard (as was the case with the stabilizations in 
Europe in the 1920s), establishing a provision (by international loans) of gold or other hard 
currency reserves by a credible authority such as the Bank of England and the Federal 
Reserve, and, in the interwar period, the Bank for International Settlements. In addition, 
private sector solutions are possible and, in fact, have been used in the past. Private sector 
guarantees of international loans, for example, were offered by Rothschilds or JP Morgan 
both before and after World War I (Bordo and Schwartz (1999)). In the more recent period, 
IMF-backed reform programs have often played an important role in successful programmatic 
reforms leading to the elimination of high inflation. 
4.2.  Zone 2: moderate inflation 
In the case of moderate inflation, such as characterized the experiences of the advanced 
countries in the 1970s and early 1980s, the prescription to improve outcomes is similar in 
spirit – tight, credible monetary policy. Two different strategies to achieve low inflation 
generally have been followed: monetary aggregate targeting and an interest rate approach, 
which in recent years has been tied to an inflation targeting framework. 
In the former strategy, the central bank uses its policy tool (eg open market operations) to 
achieve a desired growth rate of some monetary aggregate consistent with achieving its 
inflation goal on quantity theoretic lines (eg Sargent (1986b)).  
In the latter strategy, the monetary authority targets a short-term interest rate to achieve the 
desired inflation target, accounting for the influence of the real economy via the output gap as 
well as other variables. To achieve a successful strategy, the monetary authority must 
ultimately focus on the real interest rate, or else the policy could create unstable nominal 
conditions; one such necessary condition for stability is that nominal interest moves by more 
than the change in the inflation rate, which is sometimes referred to as the Taylor principle 
(Taylor (1999)). In a sense the modern approach is more akin to the Wicksellian approach in 
which the monetary authority targets the natural rate of interest (Woodford (2003)).
32
                                                           
 
31  The costs of large credible disinflations are estimated to be rather small (Sargent (1986a&b)). Andersen 
(1992) and Ball (1994) provide additional cross-country evidence that the costs of disinflation (in terms of 
the sacrifice ratio) differ systematically with the size and speed of the disinflation and the extent of wage 
flexibility. Also see Siklos (1995) for a review of twentieth-century inflations and disinflations. Recently, 
Erceg and Levin (2003) argue that a policy of monetary contraction inevitably would lead to a (temporary) 
real contraction in the face of inelastic price expectations and nominal rigidities, but the more credibly 
perceived the commitment to restore price stability, the lower the sacrifice ratio. Credibility and the cost of 
disinflation would also depend on future political outcomes and economic shocks – developments which 
would be difficult to predict with precision. Such developments could also make it difficult to rule out a 
return to an unfavorable regime of the type seen in the past (Gagnon (1997)). 
32  It took about a decade (1979-1992) for the United States, United Kingdom and other advanced countries to 
achieve this outcome. Doing so required following a preemptive policy on several occasions (eg 1994) to 
  22 
Higher levels of inflation have historically been associated with higher inflation uncertainty. 
Such volatility would naturally mean that ex ante and ex post short-term real interest rates 
would be quite volatile. This behavior would generally diminish the usefulness of interest 
rates as instruments and guides of monetary policy and would lead to a preference for 
monetary aggregate targeting. As inflation declined and credibility for low inflation increased, 
interest rate uncertainty would likely decrease and variation in the nominal short-term interest 
rate would largely reflect variation in real rates. This improvement bolsters the case for using 
a Wicksellian real interest targeting strategy at the lower end of the inflation range in this 
zone.  
Also with disinflation, velocity would likely become less predictable in large part because 
financial innovation could play a more dominant role in its fluctuations, further strengthening 
the case for interest rate. Looking forward, if the pace of and nature of financial innovation 
were to have a more muted effect on velocity, it is conceivable that central banks would raise 
the weight of monetary aggregates in their conduct of monetary policy. 
In this zone, a mixed monetary policy strategy makes good sense. The monetary aggregates 
arguably have provided a tried and historically true guide for monetary policy, if only to 
provide a broad mooring of the price level over time; arguably, the relationship between the 
monetary aggregates and inflation has been imprecise in the short run but has been fairly close 
over the medium run in many economies (Haug and Dewald (2004)). As history has shown, 
however, financial innovations have at times adversely affected the stability and predictability 
of velocity; even some of the recent instability has reflected the lingering vestiges of 
inefficient Great Depression-era regulatory constraints being lifted. To be sure, interest rate 
“rules” based on output gaps have had success as guides for policy, especially as inflation has 
become moderate or low. But, this does not suggest that the monetary aggregates should be 
completely ignored. Rather it suggests that relying both on the monetary aggregates and 
interest rate rules based on economic measures related to short-term price pressures as guides 
for policy has considerable appeal. The ECB’s two-pillar approach is an example of such an 
approach (Issing (2001), Issing et al (2001), Masuch et al (2002)).
33  
4.3.  Zone 3: low inflation/price stability 
In this zone, with a credible nominal anchor in place, consumers, workers and investors would 
incorporate expectations of price stability, or low inflation, into their decision-making. They 
would also anticipate that departures of the price level from some reference value, or of 
inflation from the low desired inflation rate, would be transitory and hence would be expected 
to be offset by corrective monetary actions. In the historical case of the gold standard, the 
credible commitment to maintain the gold parity, except in cases of wartime emergency, 
firmly anchored expectations. In credible fiat currency regimes, an anchor could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
raise real rates above the prevailing nominal rate and in effect respond to an “inflation scare” (Goodfriend 
(1993), Orphanides and Williams (2003)). 
33  The 2003 restatement of the ECB’s policy strategy emphasized its two pillar approach. The pillars do not 
represent two approaches, per se, but rather complementary ways to assess the overall assessment of the risks 
to its price objectives. In particular, economic indicators of short-run price pressures are first analyzed and 
then cross-checked with the medium-term and long-term implication from the monetary aggregates. Issing 
(2002) offers an analysis of the deflation risk in the euro area which illustrates how a central bank may use 
the monetary aggregates to assess the monetary environment. For a dissenting viewpoint, see Galí et al 
(2004). For a more general discussion of some issues, see Viñals (2000). 
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established as an implicit policy rule to achieve the monetary authority’s inflation, or price 
level, goal. 
In the current policy context, two important issues are how a central bank might best enter this 
zone and how the central bank might maintain it once it is achieved. For most advanced 
countries, the success in achieving low inflation environments over the past decade or so 
through, in many cases, a deliberate and gradual disinflation into this zone from zone 2 has 
meant that most of the discussion has revolved around its maintenance. The disinflation was 
achieved via tight monetary policies. Such policies led naturally to subpar growth at times, as 
the literature on empirical sacrifice ratios has emphasized. There is some evidence to suggest 
that the more credible and transparent the resolve of the monetary authority, the lower were 
the transition costs (Erceg and Levin (2003)). An alternative, the opportunistic approach may 
represent a lower-cost strategy (Bomfim and Rudebusch (1998), Orphanides et al (1997)). 
Under such a strategy, the monetary authority would wait patiently for a favorable price shock 
to materialize and produce a lower inflation rate. Once achieved, the maintenance of the low 
inflation/price stability zone is thought to require low-inflation vigilance where the monetary 
authority adopts a more symmetric approach to fighting both rising inflation pressures and 
declining inflation pressures.  
An important potential policy concern that arises in this zone is the proximity of the zero 
lower bound for nominal short-term interest rates. If inflation were to fall low enough, 
possibly into deflation, a monetary authority would generally find it increasingly difficult to 
use short-term interest rates as an accurate measure of the stance of policy or as a reliable 
policy guide. Moreover, short-term policy rates could prove to be a poor means to 
communicate the policy intentions of the monetary authority. Again, the historical evidence 
from Meltzer (1999) underscores this point. 
The problems with short-term nominal interest rates, however, should not be construed to 
mean that the monetary authority necessarily loses its room for maneuver. In fact, the 
historical record makes clear that the monetary authority may have ample room, especially if 
the financial sector is healthy. Moreover, the recent debate over the implications of the zero 
lower bound has emphasized the various options available for policy makers (Bernanke and 
Reinhart (2004), Yates (2003)).
34 The monetary authority could adopt non-conventional 
measures to conduct policy such as targeting long-term interest rates, pursuing unsterilized 
foreign exchange intervention, adopting quantitative easing (by focusing on monetary targets) 
and purchasing goods and commodities outright. History suggests that the most time-tested 
means at the central bank’s disposal is the expansion of the money supply via the monetary 
aggregates – both narrow and broad measures. By using open market operations to increase 
the reserves of the commercial banks, the central bank could boost aggregate demand and 
achieve its desired inflation rate (Lucas (2004)).
35
                                                           
 
34  They also highlight the use of communication strategies to shape interest expectations, central bank asset 
rebalancing to influence the relative market supplies of different types of debt securities, foreign exchange 
rates and the expansion of the monetary base.  Andrés et al (2004) illustrates that imperfect asset substitution 
in a general equilibrium setting can provide an additional channel for monetary policy by operating on the 
long-term interest rate; the simulation results suggest at least a modest influence is available. McCallum 
(2000) describes how monetary authorities can use the exchange rate even when the zero lower bound is 
binding. 
35  The recent academic debate on the monetary aggregates suggests that even at low levels of inflation the 
monetary aggregates are sufficiently correlated with inflation to be of importance in the conduct of monetary 
policy. This line of argument using new Keynesian models is most forcefully argued by Nelson (2003). 
Gerlach and Svensson (2003) also provide some evidence to suggest the P* model might be useful in 
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4.4.  Zone 4: low-to-moderate deflation 
The low-to-moderate deflation zone (roughly 0% to 3% deflation) might be viewed by some 
as the next logical step towards truly realizing the benefits of low inflation. Such an outcome 
would naturally build on the recent trend toward reducing inflation. Of course, achieving this 
would technically require tighter monetary policy. But more important, it would require the 
resolve to do so. Recent history raises doubts about the eagerness of central banks to pursue 
such a goal. In contrast to the distant past, policy makers have shown a reluctance to target 
deflation; if anything, monetary policy makers around the globe have generally perceived 
deflation as being undesirable. Nonetheless, as pointed out above, theory suggests that central 
banks may be able to increase economic welfare by reducing the inflation rate at least to true 
price stability-ie where the price level on average is flat. Some other theories suggest that the 
optimal inflation rate may be as low as somewhere near -3%. The attractiveness of the 
moderate deflation policy would depend on the empirical relevance of several important 
assumptions in the theories, not least of which includes the nature of downward nominal 
rigidities and the benefits of steady-state deflation. 
This zone could present some additional complications arising from cyclical variation of price 
changes around the steady-state deflation rate. As discussed above, the zero lower bound for 
nominal interest rates would present complications for policy makers. And, of course, the 
closer the economy initially is to zero lower bound, the more likely the bound would be 
reached. The likelihood of reaching a zero nominal rate would depend on the steady-state 
deflation rate and on the type of shocks affecting the real interest rate. Negative demand 
shocks, for example, would likely generate both transitory declines in the real interest rate and 
disinflation. In this case, the zero lower bound for short-term nominal interest rates would 
more likely bind than if the steady-state inflation rate were higher. A similarly-sized supply 
shock would present less of a problem because of the tendency for the real rate to increase, 
and therefore offset the disinflationary effect on the probability of hitting the zero lower 
bound.  
This suggests several possible policy options. Of course, the central bank could steer clear of 
the zero lower bound by choosing a higher steady-state inflation rate – something in zone 2 or 
3. The cost of this choice would be the foregone stream of benefits from the lower inflation 
rate. Alternatively, the central bank could rely more heavily on quantitative measures of 
monetary policy rather than on short-term interest rates to guide monetary policy. One 
interesting idea comes from the theoretical findings of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2002). They argue that a central bank could eliminate some of the problems associated with 
the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates by switching from an interest rate rule to a 
monetary aggregate rule when nominal interest rates got sufficiently low.
36 Along these same 
lines, a monetary authority might use several different types of contingent rules for various 
policy instruments, which not least of which include targeting exchange market rates possibly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
European monetary policy. For a more skeptical view about the marginal usefulness of the monetary 
aggregates, see Svensson (1999a) and Svensson and Rudebusch (2002). 
36  Arguably, the Bank of Japan switch in recent from interest rate targeting to quantitative easing reflects the 
difficulty of formulating monetary policy in terms of short-term interest rates when the zero lower bound for 
nominal interest rates is binding. The more recent policy of quantitative easing (ie targeting commercial bank 
reserves) has parallels to the monetary targeting strategy followed by the United States in the 1930s, but has 
only recently begun to show some signs of boosting aggregate demand; as of the Summer 2004, deflationary 
pressures have been waning with some of the upside pressures coming from the transitory influence of 
relative price changes. Sustained inflation, and expectations that it will persist, have yet to be realized. 
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through greater emphasis on exchange rate interventions; this particular option, however, may 
be more feasible for small economies than for large ones, as discussed above.  
Central banks might also find it useful to take actions that more effectively shape private 
sector expectations, as has been emphasized in the recent literature on the liquidity trap. One 
possibility is the adoption of a new policy regime with a stronger nominal anchor. As the gold 
standard period illustrates, a price level anchor appears to have been effective in preventing 
the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates from being hit. Another means to shape 
expectations is through words, rather than actions. Central banks that provide a more 
transparent and credible policy regime are more likely to achieve their goals (Fracasso et al 
(2003)). Hence, zone 4 would put a premium on central bank credibility and transparency in 
order to prevent adverse outcomes. This suggests that a central bank interested in entering and 
maintaining zone 4 would likely want to place particular emphasis on clear, credible 
communication. Indeed, the stronger the perceived commitment of the monetary authority to 
maintain the inflation rate in a particular narrow range, or the price level on a particular path, 
the less likely a pathological expectational channel would be realized. Other possible policies 
to minimize the macroeconomic risks include well designed fiscal and prudential polices 
responses. 
What we have discussed so far assumes that policy makers fully understand the economic and 
policy environment. This assumption could be at odds with reality during the transition from a 
low inflation environment to a low-to-moderate deflation environment. This uncertainty 
would represent a potential cost policy makers would have to factor into their decision to 
enter zone 4. The new economic environment could present challenges owing to the 
possibility that policy makers might need to recalibrate their monetary policy strategies and 
might find the private sector responding differently than in zone 3. As Lucas (1976) pointed 
out, when a monetary policy regime changes, the economy might respond quite differently – 
especially if we do not have good theories to model the change.  
Finally, a key concern arising from being in zone 4 is the possibility that a modest shock 
could initiate a sequence of events that could cause the economy to careen uncontrollably into 
an ugly deflation. While it is impossible to rule out such possibilities in any of the zones, 
history has shown that deflationary spirals are extreme outcomes that rarely occur in isolation 
but rather is a product of the confluence of bad economic shocks, bad policies and bad luck. 
We consider this unlikely outcome in zone 5. 
4.5.  Zone 5: deep deflation 
In a situation like the Great Contraction of 1929-1933, many have argued - persuasively in 
our view - that expansionary monetary policy could have softened the blow to the economy. 
But, as contractionary forces became sufficiently strong and the monetary transmission 
mechanism sufficiently impaired, expansionary open market purchases could have driven 
down short-term interest rates to the zero lower bound without the expected stimulus 
permeating the economy. Clearly, if such an extreme were to occur, a monetary aggregate 
targeting strategy would be superior in such a situation. Indeed in the 1930s US experience, 
short-term interest rates did approach zero by the end of 1932. When the Federal Reserve 
expanded open market purchases by $1 billion in the spring of 1932, it did succeed in 
temporarily stimulating the economy. This policy was abandoned after several months, some 
argue, because of concern over the Federal Reserve holdings of free gold (gold reserves in 
excess of statutory requirements) (Eichengreen (1992)); the evidence, however, is not 
thoroughly convincing on this point (Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (2002)). Others argue 
that it was abandoned because Congress, which had pressured the Federal Reserve to 
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stimulate the economy, went on recess in July 1932 and the Federal Reserve reverted back to 
its original “liquidationist stance” (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)).
37 Although the zero lower 
bound was reached in late 1932, a successful reflationary monetary policy was initiated in 
March 1933 by the US Treasury actively purchasing gold (and silver) in a deliberate attempt 
to devalue the dollar.
38 This evidence supports the cases both for conducting open market 
operations in assets other than short-term paper and for the use of monetary aggregate 
targeting in the case of severe deflation. 
In the case of the US Great Contraction, although monetary policy did eventually end the 
“ugly” deflation, the recovery was attenuated by other policies followed by the Roosevelt 
administration. The NIRA, established to artificially raise wages and prices by restricting the 
supplies of labor and commodities reduced aggregate supply in 1934-35 below what it would 
otherwise have been (Weinstein (1981), Bordo, Erceg and Evans (2000), Cole and Ohanian 
(1999)). 
In light of the recent deflation in Japan, it is useful to highlight the financial developments 
during the Great Contraction. The United States effectively resolved its banking crisis by not 
allowing forbearance (ie all insolvent banks were closed) and the Banking Holiday of March 
1933 in which all of the commercial banks were closed for a week to determine which banks 
were solvent. At the end of the week one-sixth of the nation’s banks were closed. Another 
policy which aided in resolution was injection of capital into the banking sector by the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Calomiris and Mason (2004)). Under this view, the 
moderate deflation in Japan is more symptomatic of deeper supply side problems than the 
inability of the Bank of Japan to boost aggregate demand via the expansion of the monetary 
base. Japan’s current quantitative easing program, with its huge increase in the money stock, 
illustrates that inflating the economy via monetary policy alone can only go so far in returning 
an economy to more normal operating conditions. In particular, monetary policy can certainly 
boost aggregate demand, as has been clear throughout the historical record and now in Japan, 
but its impact on supply side developments is rather tenuous and the interaction of the supply 
side and the monetary transmission mechanism can get seriously distorted in a way that can 
complicate the calibration of the monetary policy response.  
Finally, but not least, it is important to note that, despite the extremes of conditions, it is not 
clear that a liquidity trap was truly realized in the Great Contraction. If it had, the monetary 
aggregates, as well as other instruments of monetary policy, would have been impotent. In 
such a situation, the monetary authority would have had few concrete options but to wait for 
fiscal and prudential policies to return the economy to a greater sense of normalcy. A set of 
intriguing alternative proposals for escaping liquidity traps has been advocated in recent 
years. Svensson (2003b), Krugman (1998), Eggertsson (2004) and Eggertsson and Woodford 
                                                           
37  Most Federal Reserve officials believed in the “real bills doctrine” which in simplest terms argued that the 
central bank should only accommodate member bank lending based on self-liquidating real bills issued to 
finance commercial activity. They should not accommodate bills financing speculative activity. In this view 
the Great Contraction was said to have resulted from “over-speculation” and it was further believed that open 
market purchases would only rekindle further speculative lending. 
38  Bordo et al (2002) demonstrate that had the Federal Reserve followed a stable money policy throughout the 
Great Contraction, by offsetting the shocks to money demand and supply that occurred, a severe recession 
could have been avoided. In a similar vein, Christiano et al (2004) conduct a counterfactual exercise in which 
expansionary monetary policy actions are taken after the shocks are revealed. They are able to avoid the zero 
lower bound constraint and offset the Great Contraction. Bordo et al (2002) provide simulations which 
demonstrate that had such policies been followed the Federal Reserve would not have been constrained by its 
gold reserves. 
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(2003) have argued that central banks could manipulate private sector expectations about 
future price levels, which in turn would boost inflation expectations once the policy was 
adopted. Svensson (2001, 2003b) offers what he calls the “foolproof” way of escaping a 
liquidity trap by simultaneously announcing a depreciation of the exchange rate and elevated 
price level target. Once the price level target was realized, the monetary authority would then 
initiate a preannounced exit strategy of a floating rate regime with an inflation (or price level) 
targeting regime. While sensible in theory, the ability of the monetary authority to precisely 
and credibly manipulate private sector expectations in a well orchestrated manner is still an 
open question.
39 Unfortunately, with little evidence of liquidity traps in the historical record, it 
is difficult to know the likely success or the risks of unintended side effects.
40
4.6.  The zonal approach: summary 
In sum, monetary policy can eliminate deflation of any magnitude just as it can eliminate 
inflation. However, the appropriate monetary policy strategy depends on the 
inflation/deflation zone that a central bank finds itself in. Emphasizing the monetary 
aggregates appears, from a historical perspective, to be rather important during periods of 
high inflation and deep deflation. During periods of low inflation, velocity over short periods 
of time has shown a tendency to be more volatile and unpredictable than variation in the 
natural interest rate, thereby tilting the balance of the arguments toward the reliance on 
interest rate instruments in the conduct of monetary policy. However, in the zone of low 
inflation/price stability and low-to-moderate deflation, the influence of the zero lower bound 
for short-term nominal interest rates makes reliance on short-term interest rates more 
problematic; hence, the balance tilts toward the monetary aggregates playing a dominant role 
as the policy instrument and guide of choice. Finally, even though monetary policy has the 
ability to generate inflation, it cannot necessarily eliminate stagnation arising from deep-
seated structural problems, especially a dysfunctional financial intermediation system.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This broad-brush historical approach has yielded important insights about deflation and 
monetary policy both in the past as well as in the present. One striking feature of the historical 
record is that deflation was a common phenomenon in the pre-World War II period owing in 
large part to the low inflation environment and the monetary regime that naturally led to 
waves of inflation and deflation. In many ways, the current policy environment better 
resembles that of the distant past than of the period from 1970-1995. This not only suggests 
that looking to the past may help resolve some current policy issues but also that policy 
models might benefit from being calibrated to those developments in the distant past. 
To an observer looking at the long history, current concerns about deflation may seem to be 
somewhat overblown. It is abundantly clear that deflation need not be associated with 
                                                           
39  Kugler and Rich (2002) have raised some doubts about whether foolproof way would have worked well in 
the case of Switzerland in the 1970s. 
40  A theoretically sound proposal based on monetary theory has also been proposed to help avoid liquidity 
traps. Goodfriend (2000) and Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2002) discuss the possibility of the Gesell tax on 
money as an alternative means to increase the room for manoeuvre with interest rate instruments when a 
liquidity trap would have otherwise formed. While theoretically interesting, its practical relevance in the 
current policy environment seems remote. 
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recessions, depressions, crises and other unpleasant conditions. The historical record is replete 
with good deflations. There are, of course, plenty of bad deflations too. But, it is unclear to us 
that the bad deflations within the context of stable nominal anchor (ie price stability) regimes 
were any worse than a similarly-sized disinflation in an inflationary environment. The 
empirical tests, both on the past and on more recent data, suggest that the asymmetries were 
not particularly daunting and might be regime-dependent. The recent experience with nominal 
wage changes also provides some insights into the possibility that as inflation rates remain 
very low, real rather than nominal compensation changes will play the key role in decision 
making, as theory would suggest. To be sure, some historical episodes of deflation were, in 
our typology, labeled as “ugly”. But the historical record makes it clear that most of those 
were isolated to the Great Depression period. While a return of such conditions cannot be 
completely ruled out for any particular economy, it is also true that once one digs into the 
reasons for deflation in the Great Depression it becomes quite clear that the possibility of its 
reappearance is hard to even imagine. Moreover, recent research has found that even during 
these extreme conditions there is little evidence that liquidity traps developed, thereby putting 
the recent theoretical literature on liquidity traps, and the need for unconventional monetary 
policy measures, in quite a different light. 
The perceived costs of deflation are also important. The possible asymmetric nature of the 
costs associated with deflation has been used to justify asymmetric monetary policy 
approaches to deviations of inflation around a central bank’s target rate, ie a more aggressive 
reaction to a deflation scare than to upside risks to inflation of the same size. If the costs are 
real and asymmetric, such policy reactions might be optimal, but they will nonetheless imply 
a tendency toward an upward bias to inflation; this policy approach would also tend to be 
procyclical. Indeed, if the costs of deflation were not asymmetric, such a policy could 
generate periodic overshooting of the inflation target – particularly during recovery periods. 
The gold standard period provides another vantage point with which to compare current 
regimes to those in the past: the credible nominal anchor. The success in the past decade or so 
in lowering the average inflation rate underscores the importance of adopting sound and 
credible monetary policy regimes. A key question going forward is whether the current 
regimes are really offering the best nominal anchors. In some respects, the current regimes 
can be improved by adopting an explicit price level target or flexible price targeting versus an 
inflation targeting regime. Other considerations would, of course, have to be considered 
before embracing such a regime, but at least with respect to the nominal anchor dimension, 
the price level approach has both theoretical and historical support. Moreover, as pointed out 
in our zonal approach to monetary policy, the importance of a strong and credible nominal 
anchor is very important in low inflation and low-to-moderate deflation zones. One additional 
issue with respect to credibility is the importance for a central bank to operate in an 
environment of sound fiscal and prudential frameworks. Having these policies in order will 
not only reduce the likelihood of a bad or ugly deflation but will also help to strengthen the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in the case of an unwelcome, but transitory, 
deflation. 
Our zonal approach to monetary policy highlights several key tradeoffs for monetary policy 
makers. First, what zone is the best for a particular central bank? Most central banks have 
shown, by revealed preference, that zone 3 is a generally preferred zone. Theory suggests that 
zone 4, the moderate deflation zone, might be even better. And, arguably some central banks 
have been operating in this zone, especially if a biased-adjusted measure of inflation were 
used. The evidence so far suggests that deflation can be a regular part of a policy environment 
without excessive fear of the imminent disaster. To be sure, such an environment may involve 
some transitional costs as agents and policy makers become used to the environment. And, 
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without doubt, some transitions might be bumpy at times. But such behavior should not be 
extrapolated to suggest that the steady state will be vulnerable to the same type of turbulence. 
Second, the choice of the low inflation and low-to-moderate deflation zones would generally 
dictate the adoption of a mixed strategy towards the conduct of monetary policy. At the very 
least, the pathological problems with short-term interest rate instruments demand more 
attention. This emphasis is somewhat at odds with the conventional wisdom. While there are 
various options that central banks can choose from, the historical record clearly points to 
greater reliance on the monetary aggregates, if only for cross-checking purposes. If velocity 
changes were better understood, the role of the monetary aggregates might play a more central 
role. This, of course, is ultimately an empirical issue. 
Third, in the end the tradeoffs for monetary policy appear to be fairly stark. On the one hand, 
central banks operating in (the lower end of) zone 3 face the fact that they will always be one 
recession or strong supply shock away from deflation. This means that interest rate rules will 
routinely become less useful as guides for monetary policy. In our view, this suggests that the 
study of the role of money in the conduct of monetary policy needs to be reinvigorated at 
central banks with the goal of designing a mixed policy strategy that relies on the both interest 
rate rules and monetary aggregate targeting. Of course, the relative weights on these strategies 
in practice will depend on the inflation/deflation zone as well as the stability of velocity for 
the monetary aggregates. On the other hand, central banks can choose to avoid most of these 
potential costs by setting their sights on a higher steady-state inflation rate; this would 
naturally yield a lower incidence of deflation but at the cost of a steady stream of losses for 
the foreseeable future associated with the higher inflation. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
The historical supply and demand shocks are estimated using a standard variant of the 
Blanchard-Quah VAR-based methods of time series analysis. Following Keating and Nye 
(1998), we estimate a VAR model of output growth and inflation while imposing moving 
average coefficient restrictions to identify temporary and permanent shocks to output, which 
are interpreted as demand and supply shocks, respectively. In particular, the model is  
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where y and π are output growth and inflation, d(t) is a vector of an intercept and time trend, 
and (γ, ε) are the permanent and temporary shocks. The estimation procedure imposes the 
constraint that  . 0 ) 1 ( 12 = θ  
The P* model has a long history in the annals of monetary economics, going back as far as 
David Hume (Humphrey (1989)). The model is derived from the equation of exchange, MV = 
PY, where M is the money aggregate, V is velocity for that aggregate, P is the price level and 
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where V* is a 10-year moving average of actual velocity and Y* is the recursively estimated 
Hodrick-Prescott measure of output.  
In this model, the price level is assumed to adjust sluggishly so that it is always catching up to 
the changes in the money supply (adjusted for long-run variation in velocity and output). 
When (P-P*)/P* >0, the price level experiences downward pressure, all else the same; when 
(P-P*)/P* <0, the price level experiences upward pressure. The bigger is the P-P* gap, the 
greater the likelihood of a big adjustment. 
The ordered probit model of deflation exploits the historical observation that deflations 
appear to have fallen into three different types: the good, the bad and the ugly. Using a 
standard latent variable formulation of the problem, assume that a latent variable  * λ  can be 
described in terms of an observation vector X in the following way as 
e X + = β λ*  
where β  is a fixed but unknown coefficient and e is a normally-distributed random variable 
with a zero mean and fixed variance,  . The relationship between the observed deflation 
type indicator and the latent variable is  







≤ < = Λ
≤ = Λ
* ), ( 2
* ), ( 1














where the α1 and α2 are unobserved threshold parameters that must be estimated. Therefore 
the conditional distribution of   on X can be written as   i Λ
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) ( 1 ) | * ( ) | 2 ( 2 2 β α λ α X X P X P i − Φ − = < = = Λ . 
The coefficientβ  and the threshold parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood 
methods. Two standard statistical measures of fit are provided in the table – the pseudo-
2 R and the percent correctly predicted metric (Green (2000)). While it is generally difficult to 
draw inferences about how the probability of a particular type from the signs of the coefficient 
estimates, the marginal effects of the effects can be measured for qualitative variables, like the 
banking crises variable. Those results are also reported in Table 7. 
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BOX 1. RECENT DEFLATION EXPERIENCES 
History has shown that in a low inflation environment the incidence of deflation can be quite 
high, and recent experience is no exception to this tendency. To put the historical lessons for 
today in a somewhat brighter light we briefly review recent policy challenges arising from 
deflation. The most notable case is that of Japan. We also consider Hong Kong (China, 
hereafter referred to as Hong Kong), China, Singapore, Taiwan (China, hereafter referred to 
as Taiwan), as well as recent “deflation scares” in the United States and Europe. 
Japan The example of deflation receiving the most attention today is Japan which has had 
bouts of falling prices since the mid-1990s. It seems to be a case of “bad” deflation 
characterized by stagnant real activity along with mild deflation (Ahearne et al (2002)). 
Arguably, the underlying cause of the Japanese problem was not deflation, per se, but the 
problems in the banking system with its concomitant adverse consequences for the monetary 
transmission mechanism (Hetzel (2004), Sellon (2004), Baba et al (2004)).
41 The continued 
weakness of the Japanese banking system, ie the inability to close or recapitalize insolvent 
banks, may have hampered the Bank of Japan’s ability to stimulate bank lending. To put it 
another way, it does not seem reasonable in retrospect that a somewhat lower real interest rate 
of a couple of percentage points would have significantly improved conditions, as experience 
with the zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing policy has revealed.  
Recent data from Japan has once again raised hopes that its economy is truly on the mend. 
Greater momentum in economic activity and tentative signs of progress in dealing with its 
structural financial issues have been promising. The extent to which the quantitative easing 
policy has helped to achieve this outcome will surely be of considerable debate for years to 
come. But, we see this correlation as suggestive evidence that it is still true that aggressive 
expansion of the monetary base sufficient to boost broader money aggregates can work to 
revive aggregate demand. It should be noted, however, that the very accommodative monetary 
policy has not been without its risks, especially since policy has had to deal with the 
consequences of an intrinsically non-monetary problem. One potential problem for the Bank 
going forward has been rapid rise in the size of the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet. It is now 
the largest in its history, growing to ¥140 trillion in early 2004, or roughly 25% of nominal 
GDP.
42 This means that when the economy returns back to a more normal situation and 
velocity returns to something closer to its historical average, the Bank will have to reduce this 
monetary overhang by draining a considerable amount of liquidity from the economy. During 
the transition, the Bank of Japan may face a delicate balancing act: if it were to withdraw the 
liquidity too quickly, it risks stalling the recovery; if it withdraws the liquidity too slowly, 
there would be the risk of an excessively strong burst of economic activity and a concomitant 
surge in inflation, at least in the short run, requiring a significant tightening of monetary 
policy that could engender considerable volatility.  
Hong Kong The deflation experience in Hong Kong reinforces our view that the distant past 
has important implications for the present. The source of the problem has not been a banking 
                                                           
41  Hayashi and Prescott (2002) see low productivity growth as the underlying problem. Fukao et al (2003) 
argue, however, that they overestimated the size of the productivity decline because of biases in aggregate 
data.  
42   By means of comparison, the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have balances sheets that 
are roughly 12%, 7% and 5% of nominal GDP, respectively. 
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problem as in Japan. For example, the banking sector, while feeling the pressures from the 
unfolding events, does not appear to have suffered from debt deflation (Gerlach and Peng 
(2002)). Rather, the persistent deflation in Hong Kong appears to reflect the consequences of 
a sharp property price decline, in the context of a currency board arrangement. The desire to 
peg to the US dollar meant that the huge wealth shock from the collapse of housing prices 
would have to be accommodated through the reduction of domestic wages and prices rather 
than through the exchange rate. And, as was seen in the post-World War I period, those 
countries that tried to force a large adjustment on domestic prices and wages, rather than 
adjusting the gold parity, faced greater and more drawn out economic adjustment costs. In an 
analogous way, the choice to stick to its nominal anchor in the form of a currency board 
instead of devaluing required considerable labor and product market adjustments. 
The experience illustrates several important points. First, asset price booms and busts may be 
a much more important source of persistent deflation than conventional supply and demand 
shocks. Second, evidence on nominal wage flexibility, while hardly perfectly flexible, shows 
evidence that as deflation became more entrenched, labor became more concerned with real 
rather than nominal changes. The sharp deceleration in nominal wage growth in the aftermath 
of the Asian crisis illustrated some downward flexibility. Nominal wage growth fell to around 
zero percent during 1998, which led to a rise in real wages as deflation took hold. However, 
since then, nominal wage and real wage growth has declined (Fan (2003)). Third, the HKMA 
could have reflated the economy more quickly but it would have come at the cost of 
abandoning their currency board. Some might see some merit to abandoning it, but clearly, in 
a fiat currency world, credible and adhered-to commitments may far outweigh the transitory 
cyclical gains associated with abandonment. The Hong Kong situation illustrates that the cost 
of reflating the economy might have been higher in terms of reputation and commitment than 
the cost of maintaining a persistent deflation. 
China China has recently been facing an acceleration in consumer prices, but in the past 
several prior years, it had experienced modest but persistent deflation. Strong economic 
growth accompanying its export-driven development strategy generated huge productivity 
gains that held price pressures in check. In addition, the access to a very elastic supply of low 
cost labor has helped to cap wage pressures, as has the excess capacity of state-owned 
enterprises which often have operated at losses. In a historical perspective, the deflation 
appeared to be of the good type. As recent price developments highlight, the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, despite some unique features of the Chinese economy, broadly 
operates as in other countries. Rapid growth in the monetary aggregates eventually translates 
into inflation. This also suggests that the traditional monetarist prescription for deflation is an 
important option for central banks in emerging market economies. Looking forward, however, 
a return to deflation, possibly of the bad type, cannot be ruled out. The vulnerabilities in their 
banking system represent a considerable source of uncertainty (Fung and Ma (2002)). Of 
course, as in the gold standard period or in Hong Kong recently, China’s choice of a pegged 
exchange rate could complicate the adjustment process, especially since many believe that the 
notional value may be out of line with fundamentals. 
Singapore and Taiwan Singapore and Taiwan have also experienced very low inflation rates 
that in certain years dipped below zero. In general, the deflation rates were rather mild and 
transitory, and largely corresponded to unexpected slowdowns in economic activity (BIS 
(2003)). More important, they did not present particularly daunting policy challenges but 
rather were examples of low inflation economies experiencing the typical procyclical 
tendencies of inflation during the business cycle. 
Deflation scares in the United States and Europe The United States has not experienced 
deflation in recent years. But it did get uncomfortably close for the Federal Reserve. In 2003, 
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as core CPI inflation continued to fall with only tentative signs of recovery, there was a risk 
that deflation would materialize. Arguably, if one were to take into account the statistical bias 
in price indexes, the United States was in the deflation zone for a short period of time. Part of 
the concern about a more persistent deflation environment came from the assessment that the 
recovery was still fragile and that strong productivity gains were keeping slack ample. In the 
end, strong stimulus from monetary and fiscal policy helped support economic growth as the 
private sector gained momentum. By mid-2004, the risks to deflation appeared to have largely 
vanished and were replaced by increasing concern about the upside risks to inflation. In some 
sense, the United States experienced a “good” deflation scare, ie one where the deflation risk 
arose from better-than-anticipated productivity gains. There is some question about how 
aggressively monetary policy should respond to good scares. If a central bank were to get 
behind the inflation curve, the easier monetary policy could translate into a rise in inflation 
above its desired rate before the effects of a subsequently tight policy permeated the economy. 
In contrast, the deflation scares in Germany and Austria are probably best thought of as “bad” 
scares, even though the risks of deflation in the euro area as a whole have been very low 
(Issing (2002), Svensson (2003a)). In these countries, deficient demand was mostly 
responsible for the concerns about falling prices. Easy monetary policy with some fiscal 
expansion (but more limited than in the United States because of the constraints, at least soft 
ones, imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact) has helped to prevent deflation from 
materializing as well as the recovery in external demand. In contrast to the US scare, the 
monetary policy response to a “regional” scare in the euro area has been constrained owing to 
the fact that euro-wide inflation has been near the upper end of the ECB’s preferred range for 
the inflation rate. The optimality of the policy tradeoff is likely to involve the costs of higher 
inflation for all versus the cost of deflation for the few. 
Switzerland’s recent experience illustrates the case where slow productivity growth (possibly 
causing the Wicksellian natural rate to decline) and cyclical weakness has led policy rates to 
close in on the zero lower bound for short-term interest rates. As the Swiss National Bank has 
emphasized, this development has not made monetary policy ineffective, but rather requires 
greater emphasis on quantitative measures and other alternative policy instruments. 
Switzerland, being a small open economy, also has had the option, via central bank 
intervention in foreign exchange markets, to depreciate the Swiss Franc as a means to help 
ward off unwelcome deflation.
43
Sweden offers the latest glimpse into an economy having recently faced a modest deflation 
scare of the “good” variety. Price changes were unexpectedly low in 2003 and early 2004 
arising from several factors, such as low import prices, the unwinding of past relative price 
increases and, potentially most important, weaker than expected unit labor costs. The unit 
labor cost developments reflect both faster productivity, which has been helping to support 
the recovery, and subdued wage trends. The scare, while short in duration, highlighted the 
risks of a temporary bout of price declines in a low inflation economy, and it highlights some 
features of the historical experience of deflation: deflation can be unexpected, associated with 
                                                           
43   See Kugler and Rich (2002) for a discussion of the Swiss National Bank’s conduct of monetary policy in the 
late 1970s low interest rate environment in Switzerland. In that situation, the Swiss National Bank pegged its 
exchange rate to forestall the deflationary pressures coming from the “excessive upvaluation of the Swiss 
Franc”. While defusing the exchange rate and deflation problems, they could not prevent an eventual increase 
in inflation. See Zurlinden (2003) for a discussion of Switzerland’s deflation experience in the Great 
Depression. 
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robust economic growth and be a regular part of a low inflation economy, especially for small 
economies. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Deflation frequency, annual, 1801 – 2002 
  1801-79 1880-1913 1914-49  1950-69  1970-89 1990-2002 
United  States  42.4 23.5 30.6  5.0  0  0 
Euro  area  ...  ...  ... 0 0 0 
Japan  ... 29.4 27.8 10.0  0 38.5 
Germany  29.1 29.4 11.1 10.0  5.0  0 
France  40.6 26.5 22.2 10.0  0  0 
Italy  33.3  32.4  25.0 0 0 0 
United  Kingdom  51.9  44.1  33.3 0 0 0 
Canada  66.7 23.5 25.0  5.0  0  0 
Belgium  43.2 44.1 25.0 15.0  0  0 
Switzerland  ... 36.4 36.1 15.0  0  0 
Netherlands  22.2 32.4 36.1 10.0  5.0  0 
Sweden  27.1 44.1 30.6  0  0  7.7 
Denmark  48.4 41.2 25.0  5.0  0  0 
Spain  ... 42.4 27.8  5.0  0  0 
Finland  47.4 32.4 25.0 10.0  0  0 
Ireland  ...  ...  33.3  5.0 0 0 
Norway  45.5  35.3  36.1 0 0 0 
Australia  61.1 44.1 22.2  5.0  0  0 
New  Zealand  ...  ...  20.0 0 0  7.7 
China  ... ... ... ...  0  23.1 
Hong Kong SAR  ...  ...  ...  33.3  0  30.8 
Indonesia  61.0 55.9 30.6 10.0  0  0 
India  33.3 35.3 36.1 20.0  5.0  0 
Korea  ...  ...    5.0 0 0 
Malaysia  ...  ...  100.0  55.0 0 0 
Singapore  ...  ...  100.0 45.0 10.0 15.4 
Thailand ...  ...    25.0  5.0  0 
Taiwan  (China)  ...  ...  ... 16.7 10.0 15.4 
Argentina  ... 41.4 36.1  5.0  0 23.1 
Brazil  27.8  44.1  13.9 0 0 0 
Mexico  ... 38.5 25.0 10.0  0  0 
Chile  48.1  32.4  13.9 0 0 0 
Venezuela  ...  ... 42.9 15.0  0  0 
Colombia  6.7 38.2 36.1 10.0  0  0 
Peru  ...  ...  33.3 0 0 0 
Egypt  ...  ... 41.2 25.0  0  0 
South Africa  ...  33.3  33.3 0 0 0 
Mean  40.9 36.7 32.3 10.7  1.1  4.4 
Median  42.8 35.9 30.6  7.5  0.0  0.0 
1 Defined as percentage of negative annual changes as a proportion of all available price index data in each episode. 
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Table 2 
Peak to trough measure of price and corresponding output changes, by country and episode 
























United  States  1837  –5.6 –29.2  6 –15.5  1837  3.9  25.5  6  3.4 
  1847  –4.2 –12.1  3 –12.1  1847  4.4  13.8  3  4.3 
  1857  –4.5  –12.9  3 –8.7  1857  4.7 14.9  3  4.6 
  1866  –3.1  –31.4  12 –6.8  1866  4.6 72.5  12  0.6 
  1881  –2.1 –9.9  5 –3.9  1881  2.7 14.5  5  1.4 
  1891  –0.9 –5.3  6 –2.7  1891  3.3 21.9  6 –0.9 
  1920  –8.5 –16.3  2 –10.8  1920  1.7  3.4  2  –2.4 
  1926  –4.4 –26.9  7 –10.3  1928  –5.0 –22.8  5 –13.3 
Japan  1920  –6.1 –46.7  10 –18.7  1920  2.3  25.5  10  –7.3 
Germany  1820  –8.0 –34.1  5 –25.0           
  1831  –5.8 –26.0  5 –15.9           
  1847  –17.4 –43.6  3 –33.8           
  1855  –2.9 –25.6  10 –18.5           
  1874  –8.2  –15.7  2 –8.4  1875  –0.6 –1.1  2 –0.6 
  1881  –2.1  –11.7  6 –4.0  1881  2.8 17.9  6  0.7 
  1891  –1.3 –6.5  5 –1.4  1891  4.0 21.4  5 –0.2 
  1928 –6.2  –22.6  4  –9.6  1928 –4.3  –16.1  4  –7.6 
France  1824  –9.4 –39.0  5 –20.4  1824  1.9  10.0  5  1.8 
  1838  –5.2 –14.9  3 –12.1  1838  1.3  4.1  3  1.3 
  1847  –1.5 –7.4  5 –3.9  1847  1.1  5.4  5  1.0 
  1856  –1.2 –3.5  3 –2.2  1856  0.9  2.6  3  0.8 
  1871  –0.8 –3.2  4 –2.2  1872  –7.0 –7.0  1 –7.0 
  1877  –0.4 –2.2  5 –2.2  1875  –0.5 –2.4  5 –8.2 
  1884  –0.5 –6.4  13 –2.3  1884  1.4 19.3  13 –2.1 
  1902  –0.3 –1.0  3 –1.0  1900  –0.4 –1.1  3 –1.6 
  1930  –7.7 –33.0  5 –14.2  1929  –2.1 –11.8  6  –6.5 
Italy  1874  –2.1 –19.2  10 –14.4  1874  1.0  10.3  10  –6.7 
  1891  –0.7 –5.5  8 –1.9  1890  –0.5 –3.4  7 –5.6 
  1926  –5.6 –36.7  8 –19.1  1926  0.7  5.4  8  –4.9 
United  Kingdom  1847  –6.5 –23.5  4 –12.1  1849  –1.7  –1.7  1  –1.7 
  1860  –4.5 –12.9  3 –11.3  1860  3.0  9.4  3  –0.8 
  1873  –3.3  –35.2  13 –9.4  1873  1.6 22.5  13 –6.1 
  1891  –4.3 –8.4  2 –8.2  1891  –1.3 –2.5  2 –2.0 
  1920  –5.3 –42.3  10 –27.5  1918  –1.4 –13.6  10 –16.3 
Canada  1882  –6.4 –12.3  2 –11.6  1882  4.1  8.5  2  0.4 
  1889  –2.5  –14.2  6 –8.8  1891  –0.6 –1.2  2 –0.6 
  1920  –5.6 –20.7  4 –12.0  1918  –1.7  –6.6  4 –10.8 
  1929  –6.1 –22.4  4  –9.7  1928  –6.8 –29.6  5 –15.4 
Belgium  1842  –7.3 –14.1  2 –14.1           
  1847  –2.9  –11.2  4  –7.1        
  1856  –5.3  –15.0  3  –7.1        
  1862  –6.1  –11.8  2  –7.3        
  1867  –2.5 –7.3  3 –3.7          
  1873  –2.6  –28.7  13 –7.9  1873  1.8 26.8  13 –0.2 
  1891  –3.1  –14.4  5 –3.8  1891  2.0 10.2  5  0.2 
  1901  –5.0 –14.3  3 –12.4  1901  2.3  7.0  3  0.9 
  1929  –4.7  –25.2  6 –9.7  1928  –1.2 –6.7  6 –4.5 
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Table 2 (cont) 
Peak to trough measure of price and corresponding output changes, by country and episode  
























Switzerland  1892  –0.9 –3.5  4 –1.2  1892  3.9 16.5  4  2.5 
  1898  –0.3 –1.2  4 –1.2  1898  3.3 13.9  4  2.9 
  1919  –5.9 –34.4  7 –22.2  1919  5.0  40.8  7  –2.5 
Netherlands  1892  –5.0 –18.6  4 –10.8  1894  –0.4  –0.8  2  –3.8 
  1920  –3.4 –29.3  10 –14.1  1920  4.3  52.8  10  –0.2 
Sweden  1842  –5.7  –11.0 2  –6.7  1842 1.8  3.7 2  1.7 
  1847  –1.4 –4.2  3 –2.9  1847  2.0  6.2  3  2.0 
  1857  –8.2 –15.7  2 –10.4  1857  2.2  4.5  2  2.2 
  1862  –3.2 –9.2  3 –5.0  1862  2.2  6.8  3  2.2 
  1874 –2.1  –23.7 13  –6.6  1874  0.6  8.7 13  –4.4 
  1891  –3.6  –10.4 3  –5.0  1891 1.4  4.3 3  0.2 
  1920  –4.8 –38.7  10 –19.8  1920  3.9  46.6  10  –3.7 
Denmark  1831  –5.5  –15.7 3  –7.5  1831 2.0  6.1 3  2.0 
  1836  –2.5 –18.6  8 –12.8  1836  2.0  17.0  8  2.0 
  1847  –5.6 –15.9  3 –11.4  1847  1.9  5.8  3  1.9 
  1856  –4.3  –12.2 3  –8.3  1856 1.8  5.6 3  1.8 
  1867  –3.2 –9.3  3 –6.2  1867  1.7  5.2  3  1.7 
  1874  –1.9  –23.1  14 –7.8  1874  2.0 31.6  14 –2.7 
  1891  –3.1  –17.4  6 –5.7  1891  3.0 19.4  6  1.9 
  1902  –1.7 –3.4  2 –3.4  1902  4.0  8.2  2  2.1 
  1920  –3.6 –31.0  10 –12.2  1920  3.9  46.2  10  –2.9 
Spain  1890  –2.7  –10.3 4  –6.9  1890 1.5  6.3 4  1.5 
  1907  –1.7 –6.6  4 –3.6  1909  –3.0 –3.0  1 –3.0 
  1926  –4.5 –8.8  2 –6.9  1926  3.8  7.8  2 –0.4 
  1931  –3.6 –13.6  4 –12.5  1929  –3.6 –25.2  8 –20.0 
Finland  1876  –3.1  –29.6  11 –9.8  1876  1.6 18.7  11 –2.7 
  1892  –6.1  –17.3  3 –9.9  1892  5.7 18.1  3 –3.0 
  1928  –4.6 –21.2  5 –11.2  1929  –1.3  –4.0  3  –2.4 
Norway  1856  –2.2  –19.9  10 –7.9  1856  2.1 22.9  10  2.0 
  1874  –4.1 –18.9  5 –10.4  1876  –1.3  –2.7  2  –3.0 
  1882  –3.2  –15.2 5  –5.9  1882 0.9  4.6 5  –0.4 
  1891  –1.7 –6.7  4 –2.5  1891  1.5  6.3  4  0.3 
  1900  –1.5 –4.5  3 –2.3  1900  1.4  4.4  3 –0.4 
  1920  –6.4 –48.6  10 –19.6  1920  3.6  42.3  10  –8.3 
Australia  1873  –1.7  –12.6  8 –4.2  1873  5.2 49.5  8 –0.3 
  1882  –2.2  –10.7  5 –3.2  1882  6.6 37.7  5 –5.6 
  1890  –6.1 –22.2  4  –8.9  1891  –5.2 –19.1  4 –12.3 
  1902  –3.9 –7.6  2 –5.5  1902  7.3 15.2  2  1.0 
  1929 –5.8  –21.2  4  –9.3  1927 –3.0  –11.5  4  –4.9 
New  Zealand  1920  –7.8 –21.5  3 –12.0  1920  –5.0  –9.8  2  –6.6 
  1929 –6.2  –22.6  4  –7.6  1929 –5.1  –14.6  3  –8.5 
Mean 
 
-4.2  -17.8  5.4 -9.4    1.1 9.3 5.3 -2.3 
Median 
 
-4.0  -15.5  4.0 -8.6    1.7 6.3 4.0 -0.6 
 
Notes: Each episode was identified by smoothing the underlying price series with a 5-year moving average. Tentative peaks and troughs 
were identified, thereby eliminating transitory price fluctuations. Then the actual peak and trough dates were chosen using the unsmoothed 
series. The algorithm to identify peaks and troughs is consistent with the methodology of Bry and Boschan (1971). 
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Table 3 
Estimates of inflation/deflation persistence (with standard errors) 
 Pre-1880  1881-1913  1918-39  1945-69  1970-89  1992-2001 












































































































































































































































































































Mean  .13 .19 .32 .31 .68 .40 
Median  .19 .12 .30 .25 .74 .40 
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Table 4 





1 1 ρ +   2 1 ρ +   F-stat 
Argentina  1886-1913 43  -0.41  0.78  17.03*** 
Australia  1880-1913 44  0.05  0.07  0.01 
Belgium  1880-1913 44  0.18  0.12  0.02 
Brazil  1880-1913 44  -0.14  0.52  2.53 
Canada  1880-1913 24  0.00  0.12  0.11 
Switzerland  1882-1913 38  0.87  0.25  4.48* 
Chile  1880-1913 32  -0.25  0.58  7.26* 
China  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Germany  1880-1913 29  0.09  0.49  1.17 
Denmark  1880-1913 41  0.19  0.09  0.07 
Spain  1882-1913 44  -0.16  0.02  0.22 
Finland  1880-1913 32  0.37  0.30  0.02 
France  1880-1913 27  -0.76  0.03  2.02 
Hong Kong  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Indonesia  1880-1913 56  -0.38  -0.92  2.50 
Ireland  ...  ... ... ... ... 
India  1880-1913 35  0.27  0.00  0.53 
Italy  1880-1913 32  0.09  0.05  0.01 
Japan  1880-1913 30  -0.21  0.40  4.17* 
Korea  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Mexico  1902-1913 42  -0.30  0.12  0.94 
Malaysia  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Netherlands  1880-1913 32  0.04  0.07  0.01 
Norway  1880-1913 35  0.54  0.11  1.40 
New Zealand  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Sweden  1880-1913 44  0.69  0.08  2.89 
Singapore  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Thailand  ...  ... ... ... ... 
Taiwan  ...  ... ... ... ... 
United States  1880-1913 24  0.24  0.47  0.43 
United Kingdom  1880-1913 44  0.08  -0.54  3.31* 
Mean     0.05  0.15   
Median     0.07  0.12   
Note: Inflation tests of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model during the gold standard period is specified as the 
following:   where   is a heaviside indicator function such that 
. The significance level of the test of the null of symmetry, 






0 1 , 1






2 1 0 : ρ ρ = H , is reported in the final 
column using monte carlo generated critical values: * = 90%, ** = 95% and ***= 99%. This tests whether inflation 
persistence was similar during deflationary and inflationary periods during the heyday of the gold standard period. 
Assuming that inflation was stationary, the appropriate measure of persistence is  i ρ + 1 . Enders and Granger (1998) focus 
on unit root tests in the presence of asymmetric persistence. Consistent with their approach, we account for the possibility 
of non-standard probability distributions of the test statistics by using Monte Carlo methods even when there is little 
evidence of unit roots. 









1 1 ρ +   2 1 ρ +   F-stat 
Argentina  1960-2003  61  0.14 0.50 1.43 
Australia  1960-2003  50  0.34 0.55 0.42 
Belgium  1960-2003  52  0.66 0.58 0.07 
Brazil  1960-2003  55  -0.08 1.61  20.61*** 
Canada  1960-2003  57  0.27 0.79  3.50** 
Switzerland  1960-2003  52  0.45 0.68 0.67 
Chile  1960-2003  59  0.95 0.61 1.14 
China  1977-2003  63  0.46 0.46 0.00 
Germany  1960-2003  41  0.50 0.83  14.71*** 
Denmark  1960-2003  50  0.18 0.24 0.04 
Spain  1960-2003  52  0.47 0.60 0.20 
Finland  1960-2003  55  0.34 0.53 0.40 
France  1960-2003  52  0.50 0.50 0.00 
Hong Kong  1960-2003  50  0.10 0.46 1.43 
Indonesia  1960-2003  64  -0.04 0.18 0.04 
Ireland  1960-2003  57  0.38 0.54 0.34 
India  1960-2003  59  0.07 0.41 1.19 
Italy  1960-2003  43  0.55 0.69 0.21 
Japan  1960-2003  55  1.09 0.33 2.19 
Korea  1960-2003  50  0.51 0.44 0.06 
Mexico  1960-2003  52  0.21 0.61 1.93 
Malaysia  1960-2003  55  0.09 0.88  5.50*** 
Netherlands  1960-2003  52  0.36 0.43 0.06 
Norway  1960-2003  55  0.33 -0.01 1.20 
New Zealand  1960-2003  57  0.15 0.22 0.04 
Sweden  1960-2003  52  0.20 0.22 0.00 
Singapore  1960-2003  55  0.11 0.80  5.54** 
Thailand  1960-2003  57  0.08 0.59 2.87 
Taiwan  1960-2003  59  0.01 0.47 1.38 
United States  1960-2003  59  0.34 0.63 1.01 
United Kingdom  1960-2003  55  0.48 0.34 0.15 
Mean      .33 .54  
Median      .34 .53  
Note: Inflation tests of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model during the great inflation period is specified as the 
following:  t t t t t t t I I ε π ρ π ρ β π π + − + + = − − − − 1 2 1 1 1
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 and π ~  is the deviation of inflation from its Hodrick-Prescott trend ( 100 = λ ). The significance 
level of the test of the null of symmetry,  2 1 0 : ρ ρ = H  is also reported in the final column. The significance level of the 
test of the null of symmetry,  , is reported in the final column using monte carlo generated critical values: 
* = 90%, ** = 95% and *** = 99%. This tests whether the persistence of deviations of inflation from its trend was similar 
during disinflationary and reflationary periods during the great inflation period. 
2 1 0 : ρ ρ = H
 





Panel symmetry tests for inflation, 1880-1913 
  United States and  
the United Kingdom 
G10 countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 



















































Output    
gap t-1
   -.002 
(.002)       -.001 
(.0007)    
Supply 
shocks t-1
    -.06 
(.10)      -.02 
(.03)   
Demand 
shocks t-1
    .01 
(.05)      -.00 
(.02)   
Bank   
Crises t-1




    .08 
(.05)       .05 
(.02)** 
2 R
  -.03 .01 .02 .01  .04  .11  .11  .09  .08 
Symmetry 
test  .85 .74 .78 .39  .71 .71 .92 .95  .69 
Number of 
obs.  68 68 68 66 371  324  324  319 163 
 
The statistical model is  t i t t t i t t i t i X I I , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 , ) 1 ( ε β π ρ π ρ π + + − + = − − − , where the model is estimated as a pooled 
regression (unbalanced panel). If the country constants were statistically different at the 95% confidence level, the model was 
estimated with fixed effects instead of a common constant. The regressors include the first lag of the country-specific annual 
growth rate of money, output gap, supply shocks, demand shocks, banking crisis variable and annual growth rate of real 
equity prices. The banking crisis indicator and money growth is from Bordo et al (2001). The supply and demand shocks 
were constructed estimated using a Blanchard and Quah (1989) long-run restrictions model for real GDP growth and 
inflation. The sources for the variables are described in Borio and Filardo (2004).The standard errors are in parentheses and 
the asterisks indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The G10 countries include Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.




Statistical determinants of the good, the bad and the ugly deflation, full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 


































(.02)**     -.004 
(0.04)        
Supply 
shocks       -.32 
(.30) 
-.31 
(.34)     
Demand 
shocks        .05 
(.11)     
Wage 
inflation        .02 
(.10)    
Interest 
rates           .13 
(.30)   
Equity 
prices            -.04 
(.07) 
            
R
2 .05 .02 .24 .24 .28 .29  .44 .25 .72 
Number of 
obs.  57 45 32 32 32 32  23 32 22 
            
Fit - actual/estimated               
Good  39/54 36/45 26/30 25/29 26/31 26/31  18/18 26/31 18/18 
Bad 10/0  5/0 4/1 4/0 4/0 4/0  4/5 4/0 3/3 
Ugly 8/3 4/0 2/1 2/2 2/1 2/1  0/1 2/1 1/1 
            
Marginal effect of the crisis indicator on the probability of the good, the bad and the ugly (Model 4) 
 P(good)  P(bad)  P(ugly) 
No banking crisis (Ci=0) .93  .06  .01 
Banking crisis (Ci=1) .38 .34  .28 
Difference .55  -.28  -.27 
 
Notes: The regressors are five-year averages prior to the peak in the price level for each episode. Construction of the supply 
and demand shocks and P* variable are described in the Technical Appendix. The other variables are described in Table 6. 
Real wage inflation, long-term interest rates and real equity prices variables are described in Borio and Filardo (2004). The 
R
2 is measured by the likelihood ratio index. The in-sample fit statistics provide an indication of how well the model fits the 
data by comparing the actual number of observations of the good, the bad and the ugly deflations in the sample with those 
implied by the model. The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the dependent variables in the model, except of 
course for Ci. 
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GRAPHS 
Graph 1 
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Cumulative permanent (supply) shock




Notes: The supply and demand shocks were estimated using a Blanchard-Quah (1989) shock identification method. A model 
of inflation and output was first estimated from 1880-1938 and the historical shocks were decomposed into those associated 
with the permanent, or supply, component and those associated with the transitory, or demand, component. See appendix for 
more details on the statistical method. 
 
  54 
Graph 2  
Deflation episodes and output performance 



















































Notes: The data are from Table 2. The non-dated, labelled data points are from those in the Great Contraction era: au = 
Australia, be = Belgium, ca = Canada, de = Germany, fr = France, sp = Spain, nz = New Zealand, uk = United Kingdom, us = 
United States. The following dated labels denote deflations with peaks before the Great Contraction: fr ’81 = France (peak 
1881), au ’90 = Australia (peak 1890), ca ’20 = Canada (peak 1920), nz ’20 = New Zealand (peak 1920), uk ’20 = United 
Kingdom (peak 1920). 
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Graph 3 
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Notes: The inflation bars represent annual consumer price inflation. The short-term rates: U.S. call money rates; Great Britian 
3-month Sterling interbank deposit rate (from 1864), minimum rate of discount (from 1936); France discount rate. The long-
term rates: US yield on long-term Treasury bonds; GB yield on consul bonds; France yield on long-term government notes; 
Norway long-term government bond yields.   
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Graph 4 
Monetary policy and deflation: the zonal view 
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  Zone 1:         π >  20 
  Zone 2:   4 < π <  20 
  Zone 3:   0 < π <  4 
  Zone 4:  -3 < π <  0 
  Zone 5:         π < -3 
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